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0. Purpose
The purpose of this article is to provide practitioners with the tools for carrying out a
competitive effects analysis of vertical and complementary product mergers. The U.S.
Vertical Merger Guidelines have not been revised since they were initially released in
31984.2 Those Guidelines are now out of date. They do not reflect current economic
thinking about vertical mergers or current agency practice.3 Nor do they reflect the
approach taken in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.4 As a result, practitioners
and firms lack the benefits of up-to-date guidance from the U.S. enforcement agencies.
The same is true for foreign jurisdictions that might look to the U.S. for guidance.
Instead, the most modern guidelines are those issued by the European Commission in
2008.5
This article is intended to partially fill the gap. This article obviously cannot state the
current enforcement intentions of the DOJ and the FTC. Instead, it summarizes the
potential harms and benefits from vertical mergers and suggests the types of factual
and economic issues that practitioners would need to analyze, and questions they
would need to ask, in order to predict the likely competitive effects of vertical mergers
during the merger review process.
The Antitrust Modernization Commission and the ABA’s 2012 Presidential Transition
Report both recommended that the Vertical Merger Guidelines be revised.6 However,
2 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984), available at
www. justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf.
3 For example, see Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A
Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); David Sibley & Michael J. Doane,
Raising the Costs of Unintegrated Rivals: An Analysis of Barnes & Noble’s Proposed Acquisition
of Ingram Book Company, in MEASURING MARKET POWER 211 (Daniel J. Slottje ed., 2002);
Jeffrey Church, Vertical Mergers, in 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1455 (W. Dale Collins ed., 2008); Michael H. Riordan,
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 145
(Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). See also the sources cited in these articles.
4 United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (August 19, 2010) [hereinafter, 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines], available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.
5 European Comm’n, Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265)
6.
6 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION REPORT:
THE STATE OF ANTITRUST LAW 2012 (February 2013) (hereinafter ABA Report) at 7,
available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_presidential_
201302.authcheckdam.pdf; Antitrust Modernization Commission, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 68 (2007) (hereinafter AMC Report). For a more skeptical view of the
need for revising the Guidelines, see Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, The Contribution of the
Merger Guidelines to the Analysis of Non-Horizontal Mergers, 20th Anniversary of the 1982
4there have been no efforts in this direction. There appear to be two primary arguments
against revising the Guidelines. One is that there is so little enforcement, and the ways
in which vertical mergers can harm competition are so myriad, that it would not be cost-
effective for the agencies to devote all the effort required for revising the Guidelines.
The other argument is that revised Guidelines likely would lead to more enforcement.7
Vertical merger enforcement is less common than horizontal enforcement. It also varies
more from one administration to another. According to our count, there have been 46
vertical enforcement actions in the 1994–2013 period of 20 years. The DOJ and FTC
brought about 31 enforcement challenges during the two Clinton administration terms.
During the two G.W. Bush administration terms, the two agencies brought only 7
enforcement actions.8 And, through 2013 of the Obama administration, the two
agencies have brought 8 enforcement actions.9 A listing of these cases, the allegations
and outcomes are summarized in the Appendix to this article.
A second purpose of this article is to reduce the workload involved in revising the
Guidelines. By summarizing the categories and analysis of harms and benefits, listing
the type of relevant evidence, and summarizing the enforcement actions over the past
20 years, the agencies will able to save time and effort. In addition, this article also
identifies several legal and policy issues that are raised by that analysis and might be
examined by the agencies and the parties during the review process. These issues
also would be relevant if and when the agencies revise the Guidelines.
1. Overview
Vertical mergers combine firms at different levels of production or distribution, whereas
horizontal mergers combine firms at the same level. In the simplest case, a vertical
merger joins together a firm that produces an input (and competes in an input market)
with a firm that uses that input to produce output (and competes in an output market).
Acquisition of intellectual property by a company that uses that intellectual property, or
who competes with other firms that do, also is a type of vertical merger. A transaction
Merger Guidelines: The Contribution of the Merger Guidelines to the Evolution of Antitrust
Doctrine, May 21, 2002, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger.htm#papers.
7 ABA Report at 8-9. Deborah L. Feinstein, Are the Vertical Merger Guidelines Ripe for
Revision, 24 ANTITRUST 5, 6-7 (Summer 2010).
8 In News Corp.’s acquisition of a stake in the parent company of DirecTV, the DOJ did not take
enforcement action in reliance of the FCC’s remedy. See infra n. 36 and accompanying text.
We therefore do not include it in our count.
9 These counts update the earlier enforcement statistics in Steven C. Salop, What Consensus?
Why Ideology and Politics Still Matter to Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601, 624–26 (2014).
5may involve both horizontal and vertical elements, as when a vertically integrated firm
acquires a competitor in one of the markets. In addition, a transaction that is primarily
horizontal may involve some vertical elements, if competitors rely to some extent on
inputs supplied by one of the merging firms or benefit from product compatibility. A
merger of firms producing complementary products also is analytically similar to a
vertical merger.
Most vertical mergers do not raise competitive concerns and likely are procompetitive.
Firms at different levels of production may need to cooperate in order to design,
produce and distribute their goods and services. Vertical mergers may increase the
efficiency of this process by improving communication and harmonizing the incentives
of the merging firms. These benefits may include cost reduction and improved product
design that can lead to lower prices, higher-quality products, and increased investment
and innovation. By reducing the cost of inputs used by the downstream division of the
merged firm, a vertical merger also can create an incentive for price reductions. In
markets vulnerable to coordination, a vertical merger might lead to creation or
enhancement of a maverick or disruptive firm, or it might disrupt oligopoly coordination in
other ways.
Vertical mergers also can raise various competitive concerns. As noted in the DOJ’s
Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, “vertical mergers can create changed incentives and
enhance the ability of the merged firm to impair the competitive process.”10 As a result,
vertical mergers can lead to the achievement, enhancement, or maintenance of market
power that harms consumers and competition. Vertical mergers also can facilitate the
harmful exercise of pre-existing market power. All of these effects can lead to higher
prices, reduced product quality, reduced variety and lessened investment and
innovation. The goal of vertical merger law and policy is to block or remedy mergers
that likely may lead to these harmful effects. These competitive benefits and harms
similarly can occur from mergers of firms producing complementary products.
While the details of the analysis vary for different categories of concerns, the focus of
the competitive effects analysis is the same—to predict whether or not the merger may
lead to higher prices or other harmful effects in the markets affected by the merger. A
vertical merger can affect competition in either or both of the upstream (input) market
and the downstream (output) market. It is also possible that additional markets will be
adversely affected by the merger.11 In analyzing these markets, the identification of
10 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 5 (2011),
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf. We do not discuss remedies in this article.
11 Exclusionary or coordinated effects could lead to effects in output markets in which the
downstream firms compete but do not use the input. For example, if there are strong
6which is the upstream market and which is the downstream markets may vary. For
example, distributors are the customers of manufacturers, but distribution services also
are a critical input required by manufacturers. Thus, it is often useful to treat distributors
as input providers rather than as customers.
As with horizontal mergers, a full analysis of the competitive effects of a vertical merger
would examine the potential competitive benefits and harms in order to predict the likely
net competitive effect on consumers and competition. The fact that multiple markets
normally are affected makes the analysis more complex. It also raises a legal and
policy issue when competition is harmed in one market but benefited in another market.
This is one of the issues that will need to be resolved in revised Guidelines.
1.1. Single Monopoly Profit Theory
It sometimes is suggested that vertical mergers in unregulated markets are unlikely to
raise competitive concerns because there is only a “single monopoly profit” and so
monopoly power cannot profitably be extended to other markets.12 This economic
theory sometimes has been used to claim that vertical mergers are seldom (if ever)
anticompetitive. However, the conditions for this theory rarely hold, and the broad claim
that there is a single monopoly profit can obscure how a particular merger may raise
real competitive concerns.
Vertical mergers seldom involve firms that have monopolies protected by prohibitive
entry barriers. If there is no monopoly, then there is no single monopoly profit. As a
practical matter, a merger may lead to foreclosure that leads to market or monopoly
power in one or both of the markets. A merger also may permit firms to achieve or
enhance express or tacit pricing coordination or parallel accommodating conduct. Even
if the upstream firm has a dominant market share, it may face potential competition from
downstream firms or other entrants, including its downstream merger partner, and the
merger may eliminate the role of the downstream merging partner in facilitating that
entry. Even where there is dominance and no threat of potential competition, a merger
may facilitate harmful price discrimination or evasion of price regulation.
The intuition flowing from the single monopoly profit theory sometimes is used to argue
that dominant firms may be able to extract profits from other levels of distribution pre-
economies of scope, then input foreclosure in the downstream market could lead to higher
prices in the related market. Similarly, there could be effects in input markets in which the
upstream firms compete but the downstream division of the merged firm does not compete.
12 The classic formulation of the single monopoly profit theory set out in the context of tying is
Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L. J. 19 (1957)
7merger through conduct such as non-linear pricing. This same argument would apply to
the firm’s pre-merger ability to eliminate double marginalization. Where this pre-merger
conduct occurs, these effects should not be double-counted in analyzing the merger.
Thus, the theory might suggest that unilateral effects concerns and elimination of double
marginalization benefits may be less significant than otherwise thought. But the
magnitude of those effects would vary, based on the conditions in an individual market,
and so would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the other
potential harms still might occur. For these reasons, the single monopoly profit theory is
not an appropriate rationale for limiting vertical merger enforcement generally.
1.2. Vertical Contracts
Exclusionary harms and certain efficiency benefits also might be achieved with vertical
contracts and agreements without the need for a vertical merger. For this reason, it
might be argued that certain efficiency claims are not merger-specific. But there may be
impediments, such as transaction costs or incomplete contracting, to achieving
efficiencies through contract. It similarly might be argued that the absence of pre-
merger exclusionary contracts implies that the merging firms lack the incentive to
engage in conduct that would lead to harmful exclusionary effects. But anticompetitive
vertical contracts may face the same types of impediments as procompetitive ones, and
may also be deterred by potential Section 1 enforcement.13 Neither of these arguments
thus justify a more or less intrusive vertical merger policy generally. Rather, they are
factors that should be considered in analyzing individual mergers.
1.3. Harm to the Downstream Rivals of Merged Firm
One policy issue that would need to be resolved in revised Vertical Merger Guidelines is
whether enforcement should be undertaken only when there is reliable evidence of a
sufficient likelihood of harm to the customers in the downstream market, or whether
there are ever circumstances under which harm to the customers of the upstream firms
13 For example, while the merging firms may have had the incentive to achieve exclusionary
effects through exclusionary contracts in the pre-merger world, such contracts may have been
subject to a variety of impediments, such as bargaining, coordination, informational, and free
rider problems. A vertical merger may be a more effective way to avoid these “transaction
costs” and achieve anticompetitive profits. Second, anticompetititve vertical exclusionary
contracts may have been deterred by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Legal prohibitions are a
classic transaction cost. Thus, the theoretical possibility that the parties or non-merging firms
did not implement exclusionary conduct via contract firms does not indicate that the vertical
merger enforcement is unnecessary, any more than the theoretical possibility that parties could
achieve efficiencies through contract would indicate that analyzing efficiencies is unnecessary.
8(i.e., the downstream competitors other than the downstream merging party) should be
sufficient to warrant enforcement action. The policy might not be the same for every
type of harm.14 For example, harm to the downstream competitors might be viewed as
sufficient if the concern is that the merger would create hub-and-spoke collusion in the
input market. However, if the concern is that the merger would cause exclusionary
effects, then it might be necessary to show harm to consumers who purchase the
downstream product.
1.4. Organizational Structure
The remainder of this article describes the analysis of competitive harms and
competitive benefits. After discussing the role and measurement of market shares and
concentration in Section 2, potential competitive harms are discussed in Sections 3–9.
Potential competitive benefits are discussed in Section 10. Because there are a myriad
ways in which the competitive harms can occur, and some have been less well
articulated, each type of harm is discussed in a separate section. However, this
imbalance in the number of sections is not intended to suggest that vertical mergers are
presumptively likely to be anticompetitive. Nor is the fact the harms are discussed
before benefits. Complementary product mergers are discussed in Section 11 and
partial ownership interests are discussed in Section 12.
2. Market Definition, Market Shares, and Concentration
The same basic principles of market definition and of calculating market shares and
concentration apply to vertical mergers as they do for horizontal mergers.
Despite the well-known shortcomings of concentration statistics, the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines have safe harbors and anticompetitive presumptions based on HHIs. In a
vertical merger, there is no change in the HHI. However, the markets shares of the
merging firms and the HHIs at the upstream and downstream levels in principle might
be used to create safe harbors or anticompetitive presumptions.15 The 1984 Vertical
14 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not require a showing of harm to consumers in the
case of buyer-side horizontal mergers, only harm to the upstream buyers. The Horizontal
Merger Guidelines do not explain how to balance these harms against any efficiencies that
would reduce the cost of the merging firms and be passed through to consumers. See 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 12.
15 Several other modified “vertical HHI” measures have been proposed in the economic
literature, based on different economic models of the upstream market. See Joshua S. Gans,
Concentration-Based Merger Tests and Vertical Market Structure, 50 J.L. & ECON. 661 (2007).
If the Vertical Merger Guidelines are revised, some might support considering those “vertical
HHIs” for reference into the Guidelines.
9Merger Guidelines had a quasi-safe harbor for markets that were not highly
concentrated. Whether to include safe harbors and anticompetitive presumptions, and
what form they should take, is another policy issue that would be raised when the
Guidelines are revised.
The agencies should be cautious about using market share and HHI measures as
summary measures of competitive concerns in vertical mergers. For example, the
upstream merging firm may currently have a large market share, but that share may not
be reflective of market power if other competitors have the ability and incentive to
rapidly expand and do not have capacity constraints. If that is the case, attempting
input foreclosure of the downstream firms’ rivals may be unprofitable. Similarly, the
upstream merging firm may currently have a small market share, but its ability and
incentive to rapidly expand may be disciplining the pricing of other upstream firms. If
that is the case, the merger might lead to profitable input foreclosure by permitting the
other upstream firms to raise their prices, disadvantaging the downstream firms’ rivals.
Vertical mergers may also raise unilateral effects concerns, both directly and through
foreclosure strategies, as discussed below. The HHI and market shares may not be the
best proxies for evaluating these concerns. As noted in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the agencies “rely much more on the value of diverted sales than on the
level of the HHI for diagnosing unilateral price effects in markets with differentiated
products.”16
Market shares also may provide poor proxies for certain types of concerns about
coordination. For example, a low market share is not inconsistent with the upstream
merging firm being a maverick or disruptive firm, or with the downstream merging firm
being a disruptive buyer. Similarly, market shares are not generally relevant to the
ability and incentive to use one of the divisions to exchange competitively sensitive
information with rivals in the other market, although the HHIs and market shares may
provide some indication about the likely gains and harmful effects from doing so.
If the agencies were to create safe harbors or presumptions based on HHIs, the HHIs of
the remaining firms, modified by the hypothetical assumption that the merging firms
were not participants, would be an appropriate set of supplementary HHIs, along with
the usual market HHIs for the two markets.17 Removing the impact of each of the
16 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1.
17 For example, if the pre-merger market has 5 firms, each with a share of 20%, then the
market HHI is 2000. The market absent the merging firm would have 4 firms, each with a share
of 25%. This modified HHI level would be 2500. These measures also are correlated in that
relatively low standard HHI plus low market shares of the merging parties would lead to a
relatively low modified HHI.
10
merging firms would be more relevant to the vulnerability of the market to coordination
adverse to the non-merging firms, if either the upstream firm withdrew its inputs from the
downstream firms’ rivals, or if the downstream firm removed its demand from the
upstream firms’ rivals when there are no other buyers. These measures might then be
relevant when evaluating input and customer foreclosure.
If the agencies are committed to formulating safe harbors based on these statistics, a
combination of measures might be used. In particular, if both merging firms have low
shares and the standard and modified HHIs in both markets also are below a certain
level (e.g., the threshold for an unconcentrated market), the agencies could study
whether they can conclude without further analysis that a vertical merger is unlikely to
raise competitive concerns.
The following sections discuss potential competitive harms and benefits in more detail.18
3. Competitive Harms
Vertical mergers can harm consumers and competition in several ways, which this
article classifies into the following categories: potential competition effects (Section 3);
exclusionary effects (Section 5); unilateral effects (Section 6); coordinated effects
(Section 7); evading regulation (Section 8); and facilitating harmful price discrimination
(Section 9). The latter two categories involve the impact of the merger on the exercise
of pre-existing market power, whereas the others involve achieving, enhancing or
maintaining market power.
Because these effects can be overlapping and mutually reinforcing, this organizational
structure is not unique. Some of the specific effects classified under a particular
category could have been classified instead under another category. For example, an
exclusionary effect may facilitate coordination or may be enhanced by the existence of
coordination. Information exchanges can have both coordinated and exclusionary
effects.
A vertical merger also may raise multiple concerns that involve effects in more than a
single category. When the Vertical Merger Guidelines are revised, the agencies might
choose to organize the categories differently or prioritize some of competitive concerns
over others.
The 46 mergers challenged in the 1994–2013 period involved a variety of allegations of
potential harm and some matters involved multiple categories of allegations. As listed
18 We follow the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in discussing the harms before the benefits. This
organization is not intended to reflect a presumption that the typical vertical merger likely is
harmful.
11
in the Appendix, elimination of potential competition was alleged in 9 matters,
foreclosure in 35 matters, misuse of competitors’ sensitive information to exclude in 22
matters, collusive information exchange in 11 matters, elimination of a disruptive buyer
or other facilitating effects in 3 matters, and evasion of regulation in 2 matters.
Unilateral effects and price discrimination were discussed but not specifically alleged as
harms in any of the matters.
4. Elimination or Reduction in Potential Competition
A vertical merger can eliminate one of the merging firms as a potential entrant or facilitator
of entry into the other firm’s market. While these issues arise in a vertical merger, they can
be construed as a type of unilateral horizontal concern, and so the agencies may have
paid closer attention to this category of harm in the past.
4.1. Merging Firms as Potential Entrants
Pre-merger, either or both of the merging firms could be potential entrants into the other
firm’s market. Established firms competing in adjacent markets may be well-situated to
enter because they may have expertise relevant to that market or easier access. The fear
of entry by a customer or supplier may serve as a constraint on the pre-merger prices of a
firm. The merger would reduce or eliminate this constraint. If either of the merging firms is
the most likely perceived or actual potential entrant (or among a few most likely potential
entrants) into the other’s market, then the merged firm may be able to raise (or maintain
supracompetitive) prices in the affected market.
Example: The DOJ’s analysis of the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger in
2010 raised potential competition concerns in that Live Nation was a
potential entrant into ticketing. Ticketmaster also may have been a
potential entrant into promotion and venues.19
Example: The FTC’s enforcement action in 2013 against the
Nielsen/Arbitron merger raised a somewhat different type of “future
market” potential competition issue. While Nielsen sold TV audience
data and Arbitron sold radio audience data, they apparently were both
19 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., No. 1:10-
cv-00139 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f254500/254544.pdf.
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potential entrants into the sale of “hybrid” (multimedia) audience data,
an anticipated future market.20
The following information would be particularly relevant to evaluating these potential
competition concerns:
 Analysis of the pre-merger market structure in the upstream and downstream
market, with a focus on whether either of the merging firms currently have
significant market power and whether entry would make a material difference to
competition.
 Evaluation of whether or not one or both of the merging firms are potential
competitors (either actual or perceived potential entrants) into the market of the
other, including any concrete plans for entry.
 Evaluation of whether or not there are sufficient other entrants equally well-
positioned to replace the loss of any potential competition provided by the
merging firms.
4.2. Merging Firms as Potential Entry Facilitators
Rather than enter itself, each of the merging firms could facilitate entry by cooperating with
or becoming a sponsor of potential entrants into the other firm’s market. After the merger,
the incentive to facilitate that entry might be eliminated. In fact, the firm might go further by
refusing to deal with the new entrant or by creating incompatible products that would be
unusable by an unintegrated entrant.21 Either way, potential entrants then would be forced
to enter both markets simultaneously. Such a “two-level entry” requirement could reduce
the likelihood of entry for several reasons, including potentially greater risk, higher sunk
costs, higher minimum viable scale, or lack of expertise or other resources needed to
successfully enter the additional market. By raising the cost, or reducing or eliminating the
likelihood of entry, the merged firm may be able to raise or maintain supracompetitive
prices in the affected market.
Example: The goal of the DOJ’s original divestiture remedy proposal in
the Microsoft case in 2000 was designed to create potential competition
20 Analysis Of Agreement Containing Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, In re Nielsen
Holdings, N.V. and Arbitron, Inc., No. 131-0058 (F.T.C. Sept. 20, 2013),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/09/130920nielsenarbitronanalysis.pdf.
21 For this reason, this category of conduct could be classified as an exclusionary effect, as
discussed infra Section 5 below.
13
for a standalone Windows Operating System company by a divested
Office Applications company.22
In addition to the information listed in Section 4.1 above, the following information would
be relevant to evaluating these potential competition concerns:
 Information relevant to evaluating ease of entry and the degree to which potential
entry is a significant constraint on pricing.
 Evaluation of whether and by how much simultaneously entry into both markets
would create greater impediments to entry.
 Evaluation of whether either of the merging firms has plans or has made moves
to facilitate or sponsor entry into the other firm’s market.
5. Exclusionary Effects
Exclusionary effects have been one of the primary potential concerns arising in vertical
mergers.23 Exclusionary effects can lead to harm not only to the downstream
competitors, but also to the customers of the downstream firms.
Exclusionary effects can, under some circumstances, lead to harm to competitors in the
form of higher input costs, but lower or unchanged downstream prices. A focus on
consumer welfare would suggest that downstream effects would be necessary for
enforcement from these exclusionary concerns, not merely harm to downstream
competitors. As noted earlier, this policy issue would need to be resolved in the Vertical
Merger Guidelines.
There are several mechanisms by which these exclusionary effects can occur. First, the
merger could lead to input foreclosure, by which the upstream division of the merged firm
refuses to sell, degrades quality, or raises the input prices charged to targeted (or all) rivals
of the downstream division of merged firm, and thereby gives the downstream division the
power to raise its price. The upstream division alternatively might threaten to deny access
or degrade quality in order to increase its bargaining power to negotiate a higher input
price.
Second, a merger could lead to customer foreclosure, by which the downstream division of
the merged firm reduces or stops purchasing inputs from the other upstream firms, which
22 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of the Final Judgment, IV.A.2, United States v. Microsoft
Corporation, 97 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2000) (No. 98-1232), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f219100/219107.pdf.
23 Exclusionary concerns also can arise in horizontal mergers. See 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines at § 6.
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then can disadvantage those firms and provide the upstream division of the merged firm
with the power to raise its price. Alternatively, the downstream division of the merged firm
might threaten to refuse to purchase in order to induce the independent input suppliers to
raise the prices that they charge to its downstream rivals.
These two types of foreclosure can function independently or can reinforce one another in
combination. For example, if customer foreclosure leads to downstream rivals paying
higher input prices, that effect will cause input foreclosure. Other markets also might be
affected. For example, if downstream rivals are disadvantaged by input foreclosure and
there are economies of scope with another product, the downstream division of the
merged firm may gain the power to raise prices in that other product market, even though
manufacturing that other product that does not use the input sold by the upstream division.
This concern may be particularly relevant for high-technology markets.
Third, the merger could provide the downstream division of the merged firm with access to
sensitive competitive information of its competitors from the upstream division of the
merged firm, which the downstream firm can use to more rapidly respond to or even
preempt competitive moves by these competitors, and deter such competitive moves as
result.24
It is important to emphasize that the economic concept of foreclosure is not well gauged by
simple “foreclosure rate” discussed in some antitrust cases. Foreclosure is substantial if it
significantly increases the costs or restricts the output of the targeted victim, and its ability
to expand in a cost-efficient way. Foreclosure thus can be substantial even if the rivals
remain viable and even if they can achieve minimum efficient scale of production. Even if
the simple foreclosure rate is low, the targeted firm may significantly lose competitiveness,
for example, if the unrestrained substitutes are less efficient or if their producers lack
sufficient capacity or have an incentive and ability to coordinate. Foreclosure also can
lead to increased barriers to entry. By contrast, even if the simple foreclosure rate is high,
rivals may not be significantly disadvantaged in the market if they have sufficient cost-
effective alternatives.
5.1. Input Foreclosure
A vertical merger can lead to the upstream division of the merged firm denying (i.e.,
refusing to sell) its input, degrading the quality of the input sold, or discriminating by
raising the input price to one or more targeted non-merging firms. If the targeted rivals
cannot substitute to other equally cost-effective inputs, their costs will be raised. This
24 Access to competitively sensitive information can also facilitate coordination, as discussed in
more detail infra Section 7.1.
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may occur if substitutes are inferior or more costly, or if the foreclosure conduct by the
upstream firm gives the non-merging input producers unilateral or coordinated
incentives to raise their prices. In addition, input foreclosure also might be used to
disadvantage a maverick or disruptive downstream competitor and thereby facilitate
coordination.25 If this foreclosure conduct materially raises the costs or reduces the
quality of the targeted rivals, they would have the incentive to raise their quality-adjusted
prices and reduce their output. If there are insufficient non-targeted competitors or
other products that provide consumers with close substitutes, then the merging
downstream firm will gain the ability to raise its price profitability. Fear of being targeted
for input foreclosure also might deter entry. As a result, consumers and competition
may be harmed.
The harmful effects in the downstream market may involve a unilateral price increase by
the downstream division of the merged firm. In response, the targeted and other
downstream rivals also typically would further raise their prices, which could cause
further price increases by the downstream division. However, these harmful effects in
the downstream market are not inevitable. Continued competition, expansion, and
repositioning by non-targeted rivals, vertically-integrated competitors and other products
may deter post-merger price effects.
Raising the price of the input generally would be more profitable than totally withholding
access to the input or degrading its quality.26 Refusing to sell may be a second-best
strategy when prices are regulated or price increases are constrained by most-favored
nation provisions. Degrading quality also may be less detectable than price increases.
Example: In the AT&T/McCaw merger in 1994, the DOJ’s concerns
amounted to a fear that AT&T would engage in input foreclosure against
McCaw’s wireless competitors.27
Example: In the Google/ITA merger in 2011, the DOJ’s input
foreclosure concerns were that Google might withhold, degrade, or
25 This issue is discussed in more detail infra Section 7.3.
26 Threatening non-price foreclosure may be used to increase bargaining power, but end up
being implemented temporarily when the bargaining process breaks down.
27 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. AT&T Corp., No. 1:94-cv-01555 (D.D.C. July
15, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158, available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-08-26/html/94-
20948.htm.
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raise the price of ITA’s travel data to Google’s competitors in a
comparative flight search market.28
Example: In the Comcast/NBCU merger in 2011, the DOJ’s and FCC’s
input foreclosure concerns were that the merged firm might withhold or
raise the price of NBCU content to Comcast’s MVPD competitors.29
The value of sales diverted to the downstream division of the merged firm leads to an
incentive to raise the price of the upstream division of the merged firm. By raising the
costs of targeted rivals, this will also cause upward pressure on their prices, holding other
prices constant. The value of diverted sales and the upward pricing pressure generally will
be higher when the diversion from targeted rivals to the downstream division of the
merged firm is higher, and when the profit margin earned by the downstream division of
the merged firm on incremental sales is higher.
In analyzing both input and customer foreclosure concerns, the following general market
information would be relevant:
 Pre-merger market structure and competition in input and output markets.
 Impact of the merger on market structure and incentives in the input and output
markets.
 Ability and incentive of non-merging input suppliers and downstream competitors to
continue to compete, if foreclosed by merging firm.
 Behavior and market impact of other integrated firms.
 Existence, structure (including any exclusionary provisions), and competitive effects
of other vertical contracts by the parties or other firms in the markets.
Beyond the general analysis of the markets, the following information also could aid in
the evaluation of the potential upstream and downstream effects of input foreclosure:
 Identification of downstream rivals likely targeted for a foreclosure strategy of either
raising price, refusing to sell, or degrading quality.
 Ability of the targeted downstream rivals to substitute to other equally cost-effective
input suppliers and the capacity and incentives of those input suppliers, including
any impact of any reduced input purchases by the downstream division of the
merged firm.
28 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Google, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00688 (D.D.C. Apr. 8,
2011), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f269600/269620.pdf.
29 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C.
Jan. 18, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf.
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 Determination of whether the other input suppliers would have the unilateral
incentives to raise their prices, or the incentive and ability to raise prices in
coordination with one another, if the upstream division of the merged firm were to
engage in an input foreclosure strategy.
 The resulting extent to which downstream rivals’ costs would be raised (or quality
decreased) if the upstream division of the merged firm refuses to sell its input or
raises its input price to the targeted downstream rivals.
 Evaluation of whether there are downstream firms (including vertically integrated
competitors) that have alternative access to inputs from other upstream firms or
upstream entry so that they will not be disadvantaged by (or targeted for) any
foreclosure that occurs.
 Evaluation of the residual competitive constraints provided by these non-targeted
downstream competitors.
 Evaluation of competitive constraints provided by other products that do not use the
inputs supplied by the upstream division of the merged firm and its competitors.
 Information relevant to estimating the rate at which variable cost increases of the
upstream and downstream are passed through as higher prices.
 Information from natural experiments relevant to estimating diversion ratios
resulting from foreclosure.
 Input pricing and sales conduct of other integrated firms in the market and
evaluation of any impact on downstream prices.
 Evaluation of the market impacts, if any, of other vertical contracts that involve
exclusivity or favoritism.
5.1.1. Gauging Input Foreclosure Effects
When there is sufficient data available, input foreclosure incentives might be further scored
with several quantitative methodologies.
5.1.1.1. Vertical Arithmetic
The vertical arithmetic methodology is a critical loss analysis that evaluates the profitability
of a non-price foreclosure tactic such as refusing to deal with targeted rivals of the
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downstream division of the merged firm.30 The methodology compares the reduction in
incremental profits borne by the upstream division from reducing its input sales to targeted
firms versus the gains in incremental profits achieved by the downstream division when
some of the sales of the targeted rivals are diverted to the downstream division. The data
used for this methodology includes the incremental profit margins for the upstream and
downstream divisions of the merged firm and the likely diversion from targeted
downstream rivals to the downstream division in the event that the upstream division
forecloses access of its input to those targeted rivals.
The vertical arithmetic methodology is most relevant where the concern is refusal to
supply. However, a limitation of the methodology is that it evaluates only whether total
foreclosure is profitable, not whether it is profit-maximizing or whether price increases
might be more profitable than total foreclosure. When the foreclosure concern is an
increase in price, rather than total foreclosure, the vertical arithmetic methodology also has
only limited applicability. The vertical arithmetic methodology cannot determine the profit-
maximizing price increase. It also does not use the information about demand elasticities
that is inherent in the pre-merger profit margins. The methodology does not take efficiency
benefits into account, nor does it permit balancing of harms against benefits.
5.1.1.2. Vertical GUPPIs
The vertical GUPPI methodology is designed to remedy the limitations of the vertical
arithmetic. The vertical GUPPI methodology is based on the value of diverted sales and
scores the direct impact of the vertical merger on the unilateral pricing incentives entailed
by input foreclosure.31 The vGUPPI scores are analytically similar to the GUPPI scores
defined implicitly in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and are proportional to the
profit-maximizing “first round” incentive to raise the prices. Two vGUPPI’s are used to
score the upward pricing pressure from the input foreclosure. The vGUPPIu gauges the
incentive to raise the input prices of the upstream division of the merged firm to targeted
downstream rivals. The vGUPPIr gauges the incentive of the targeted rivals to raise their
downstream prices in response to the higher input price.32 When there are cognizable
efficiency benefits or unilateral incentives to raise the price of the downstream division, the
30 For the recent application in Comcast/NBCU, see Jonathan B. Baker et. al., The Year in
Economics at the FCC, 2010-11: Protecting Competition Online, 39 REV. IND. ORG 297, 302-
304 (2011).
31 Serge Moresi & Steven C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Pricing Incentives in Vertical
Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 185 (2013).
32 Id. Moresi and Salop suggest that the vGUPPIr is the more relevant measure because it relates
more closely to the degree of potential consumer harm, as opposed to competitor harm.
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vGUPPIr also can be combined with the upward or downward pricing pressure from those
effects, as scored by the vGUPPId.33
5.1.1.3. Merger Simulation
As with horizontal mergers, where there is sufficient data, merger simulation models
sometimes are used to go beyond vertical arithmetic and vGUPPIs to quantify the
equilibrium price effects of vertical mergers. Simulation models in principle can combine
the analysis of both harms and benefits into a single structure to predict net effects in the
upstream and downstream markets. For horizontal mergers, the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines state that the agencies “do not treat merger simulation evidence as
conclusive in itself, and they place more weight on whether their merger simulations
consistently predict substantial price increases than on the precise prediction of any
single simulation.”34 For this purpose, the agencies typically will examine the assumed
demand and econometric structure, the data, and the robustness of the estimates.
5.1.2. Input Foreclosure Threats
In situations where the upstream division of the merged firm negotiates prices with the
downstream firms, the upstream firm might use the threat of foreclosure to negotiate
higher prices from the rivals of the downstream firm. The credibility of the threat and
bargaining power of the upstream division of the merged firm are increased by the merger
because a failure to reach agreement with a downstream firm would harm the upstream
firm less than it did absent the merger. This is because the profits of the downstream
merging partner would increase if the agreement were not reached. This improved
alternative for the merged firm generally allows the upstream firm to obtain a higher
negotiated payment.
Example: Input foreclosure threats were analyzed by the DOJ and FCC
in 2011 in the Comcast/NBCU merger, where the issue was the potential
that Comcast might have the incentive to withhold or raise the price of
NBCU programming to its MVPD rivals.35
Example: Foreclosure threats also were analyzed by the DOJ and FCC
in 2004 in the News Corporation/DirecTV partial ownership acquisition,
33 The vGUPPId is discussed, infra Sections 5.1.1.2 and 10.1.
34 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1.
35 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 (D.D.C.
Jan. 18, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf.
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where the issue was the potential that News Corporation might have the
incentive to withhold or raise the price of programming to its MVPD
rivals.36
This incentive to use input foreclosure threats to increase negotiated prices can be scored
with an equilibrium bargaining analysis methodology that evaluates the impact of
temporary or permanent reduction of supply on the profits of the upstream division of the
merging firm and a targeted downstream firm. The methodology assumes that a larger
relative impact on the profits of the downstream firm will lead to an increase in the
negotiated payment, relative to the pre-merger price.37
5.2. Customer Foreclosure
A vertical merger can lead to the merging downstream firm refusing to buy inputs from
non-merging input suppliers. The strategy can disadvantage those upstream rivals and
provide the upstream division of the merged firm with the power to raise its input price.
Alternatively, the downstream division could use threats to foreclose to induce those input
suppliers to raise the prices they charge its downstream rivals. This actual or threatened
customer foreclosure also can create or reinforce input foreclosure by raising the costs of
the downstream rival firms.38 As a result, downstream rivals and consumers may be
harmed by the conduct.
Example: Although the FTC focused only the horizontal aspects of the
case in 2014, the private litigation raised customer foreclosure as an
issue in the St. Luke’s/Saltzer merger.39
36 The DOJ did not have a consent decree but relied on the FCC Order. Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge News Corp.’s Acquisition Of Hughes
Electronics Corp. (Dec. 19, 2003),
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/December/03_at_714.htm.
37 For a recent application, see Baker et. al. supra note 30. As a simplification, the typical
analysis often assumes a lump sum negotiated payment, not a per unit negotiated price that
would lead to effects on the downstream market outcome. Under certain conditions where
refusal to purchase by the merged firm would cause the negotiating seller to exit from the
market, the merger might lead to the merged firm having to pay a higher price.
38 Threats of foreclosure are discussed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 8.
39 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Fed. Trad. Comm’n v. St. Luke’s Health System,
Ltd., No. 1:13-CV-00116 (Jan. 24, 2014), available at
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140124stlukesfindings.pdf.. For the private case,
see Saint Alphonsus Medical Center - Nampa, Inc. et al. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 2012
WL 6651167, *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 20, 2012). This concern might be classified instead as input
foreclosure in that the payers tend to be third-party insurance companies or managed care
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Example: Customer foreclosure concerns were raised by the FTC in
1997 in the Time Warner/Turner merger, regarding the possibility that
Time Warner Cable would refuse to carry Fox News or MSNBC, which
were competitors’ to Turner’s CNN network.40
Example: Customer foreclosure concerns were analyzed in the
Comcast/NBCU merger by the FTC and FCC in 2011. The customer
foreclosure issue was whether Comcast would carry competitors of
NBCU.
The analysis of customer foreclosure would include an evaluation of the effects on
upstream rivals if they are denied access to significant sales to the downstream division of
the merged firm. The conduct can reduce their sales, which can lead them to exit or have
higher costs, or reduce their incentive to invest. Either way, the upstream division of the
merging firm may gain market power in the input market. In addition, because customer
foreclosure can cause or reinforce input foreclosure, the information regarding input
foreclosure also would remain relevant for the customer foreclosure concern as well.
The following specific information also could aid in the evaluation of the potential
upstream and downstream effects of customer foreclosure concerns:
 Evaluation of whether the downstream division of the merged firm would have the
ability to shift significant input purchases to the upstream division of the merged
firm, and if so, determination of the resulting loss of sales to other upstream firms.
 Evaluation of the impact of those lost sales on the ability of one or more upstream
firms to compete, and whether it might lead to the exit of any upstream firms, or
higher costs, or reduction in investment incentives.
 Evaluation of whether the downstream division of the merged firm would have the
power as a buyer to induce upstream firms to raise the input prices they charge to
its downstream rivals (e.g., by threatening not to purchase).
 Whether non-merging upstream firms would have increased opportunities to sell
additional inputs to non-merging downstream firms that might no longer wish to
operators, and that the patients are inputs who are steered to one or another hospital by the
doctors. Where the merging firms produce complementary products, it is often possible to
categorize the foreclosure either as input or customer foreclosure.




deal with the upstream division of the merged firm or would have very elastic
demand for their inputs.
 Whether the upstream division of the merging firm or other upstream firms would
gain the power to bargain for higher prices with the non-merging downstream firms.
 The resulting impact, if any, on the costs of non-merging downstream firms and
downstream competition, as analyzed for input foreclosure.
 Purchase behavior of other integrated firms in the market and evaluation of any
market impact.
 Evaluation of the market impacts, if any, of other vertical contracts that involve
exclusivity or favoritism.
5.3. Misuse of Competitors’ Sensitive Information
A vertical merger can lead to information transfers from rivals to the merging firm that
might be misused strategically by the downstream division of the merged firm to
preempt and thereby deter procompetitive actions by non-merging firms.41 If the
merging firm obtains a rival’s sensitive competitive information and uses it to respond
more rapidly to the rival’s moves with its own price decreases or product improvements,
competition would seem to be benefited. However, this quick response actually would
reduce the incentives of the rivals even to attempt the procompetitive moves, in that
their first-mover advantages would be reduced. Thus, consumers may be harmed by
the misuse of rivals’ information.
Anticipating such misuse of its sensitive information, rivals might choose not to deal with
the upstream division of the merged firm after the merger and instead purchase from
more expensive or lower quality alternatives. In that case, the competitive harms in the
downstream market from the misuse of competitors’ sensitive would be replaced by the
adverse competitive effects of the rivals essentially being forced by the merger to
engage in what could be characterized as involuntary self-foreclosure.
Example: The FTC’s remedies in 2010 of the Coca-Cola/CCE bottler
merger and the parallel Pepsi bottler acquisitions focused on potential
misuse of information about Dr. Pepper in a way that appeared to raise
exclusion concerns.42
41 Coordinated effects from information exchanges are analyzed infra Section 7.1.
42 Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re The Coca-
Cola Company, No. 101-0107 (F.T.C. Sept. 27, 2010),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/09/100927cocacolaanal.pdf; Analysis of
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Beyond the general analysis of the market structure of the downstream and upstream
markets, the following information would be relevant to the evaluation of misuse of
competitors’ sensitive information:
 Determination of whether the upstream division of the merged firm has pre-
merger access to sensitive competitive information about downstream firms,
such as advance notice of new products or new product specifications.
 Determination of whether the downstream division of the merged firm has pre-
merger access to sensitive competitive information about upstream firms, such
as prices and new products or technologies.
 Evaluation of whether the merged firm would be able to use this information to
quickly respond or preempt competitive moves by its competitors.
 Determination of whether fear of this preemption likely would lead non-merging
firms to avoid dealing with the merged firm, even if alternatives were more
expensive or lower quality.
6. Unilateral Competitive Incentives to Raise Downstream Prices
A vertical merger may lead to a unilateral incentive for the downstream division to raise its
price in order to increase the input sales and incremental profits of the upstream division.43
This incentive would occur in situations where the downstream division’s rivals purchase
inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm. This means that an increase in the
price of the downstream division may lead in turn to those downstream firms purchasing
additional inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm, which then would capture
incremental profits on those sales. This incentive creates unilateral upward pricing
pressure analogous to the unilateral effects of horizontal mergers, as discussed in the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.44
The unilateral incentives of the downstream division to raise price can be gauged in terms
of the value of sales diverted to the upstream division of the merged firm in the event that
the downstream division of the merged firm were to raise its price by a small, but
Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re PepsiCo, Inc., No. 091-0133
(F.T.C. Feb. 26, 2010),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/02/100226pepsicoanal.pdf.
43 See Moresi and Salop, supra note 31.
44 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6.1.
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significant, amount or to reduce its output.45 The unilateral incentive to raise the price of
the downstream division of the merged firm generally will be higher if the market share of
the upstream division of the merged firm is higher, if the profit margin earned by the
upstream division of the merged firm on incremental sales is higher, and if the price of its
input is a substantial fraction of the cost of the downstream firms. The upward pricing
pressure from this unilateral incentive alternatively might be small or non-existent.
This unilateral incentive of the downstream division to raise its price may be mitigated or
even reversed by a corresponding unilateral incentive to reduce its price as a result of
taking into account in its pricing a lower real resource cost for the inputs purchased from
the upstream division of the merging firm, what has been called “elimination of double-
marginalization.”46 The downward pricing pressure from elimination of double-
marginalization also alternatively might be small or even non-existent.47 Thus, while they
are distinct, these two unilateral effects often are evaluated in tandem. Which incentive
likely dominates depends on the facts of the merger. A profit-maximizing downstream
division would view the overall company’s “opportunity cost” of the input as reflecting the
net effect of these two factors.
As in horizontal mergers, the upward pricing pressure may be offset by entry or
repositioning by other competitors, though the exclusionary effects of foreclosure may
reduce the likelihood of repositioning and entry.
When there is sufficient data available, the unilateral incentive to raise the downstream
price can be gauged by analysis of diverted sales from the downstream division to the
upstream division, if the downstream division were to raise its price and lose sales to other
firms that purchase inputs from the upstream division. The vGUPPId scores the resulting
upward pricing pressure of the price of the downstream division.48 This vGUPPId scores
the value of diverted sales and depends on the upstream firm’s incremental profit margin,
45 After the merger, the unintegrated rivals may not wish to purchase inputs from the upstream
division of the merged firm. Substituting to other input suppliers may increase their costs and
thereby create competitive concerns, as discussed supra Section 5.1.
46 This “elimination of double marginalization” efficiency claim is discussed infra Section 10.1.2.
47 There are several reasons why the effect might be small. First, the downstream division of the
merging firm may not have the ability to use the inputs produced by the upstream division.
Second, the upstream division may be selling its inputs to the downstream division at a price equal
to marginal cost in the pre-merger market. Third, the merged company may have a policy of each
division treating other divisions at arms-length. Fourth, the elimination of double marginalization
may not be found to be merger-specific. Elimination of double marginalization is analyzed in more
detail along with analysis of other efficiency benefits in Section 10.
48 See Moresi and Salop, supra note 31.
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the share of the sales lost by the downstream firm that are diverted to other firms that
purchase inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm, the magnitude of those
likely incremental input purchases by the downstream rivals, along with input and output
prices. The vGUPPId also can be extended to take into account the potential effects from
elimination of double marginalization.49
Beyond the general analysis of the market structure of the downstream and upstream
markets, certain information relevant to evaluating these unilateral pricing concerns would
include the following:
 If the downstream firm raised price and lost a certain percentage of its sales, the
fraction of those sales that would be diverted to other firms which would purchase
inputs from the upstream division of the merged firm in order to satisfy their
incremental demand.
 The likely increased input purchases from the diverted sales obtained by the
upstream division.
 The incremental profit margin of the upstream division of the merged firm and the
resulting incremental profits earned by the upstream division of the merged firm on
those increased input purchases from the diverted sales.
 The incremental profit margin of the downstream division of the merged firm.
 The potential for repositioning by other downstream firms.
 The potential for rapid entry and longer term entry into the downstream market.
 Evaluation of the pricing behavior of other integrated firms.
7. Coordinated Effects
A vertical merger might raise several potential coordinated effects concerns in either the
upstream market or the downstream market.50 First, a vertical merger may facilitate
collusive interfirm information exchanges. Second, a vertical merger may facilitate
coordination in the upstream market by eliminating the incentives of the downstream
division of the merged firm to act as a disruptive buyer that deters coordination by
upstream firms. Third, a vertical merger may facilitate coordination in the downstream
market by weakening the disruptive behavior of a non-merging downstream firm. This
49 Id.
50 Vertical mergers potentially also could reduce the likelihood of coordination, as discussed
infra Section 10.2.
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weakening of the maverick or disruptive firm can be implemented with targeted input
foreclosure or threats of foreclosure.51 Fourth, a vertical merger could facilitate
coordination by creating more symmetry in costs or placing the merged firm in a stronger
position to punish defectors.
7.1. Collusive Information Exchanges
A vertical merger can lead to coordinated effects concerns by facilitating information
exchanges between firms at the same level of production. The downstream division of the
merged firm might share information about the prices of the upstream firms with the
upstream division of the merged firm, and vice versa. In this way, consensus can be
reached or detection lags can be reduced, both of which can facilitate coordinated effects
or parallel accommodating conduct.
Example: The DOJ’s analysis of the GrafTech/Seadrift merger in 2010
focused on collusive information exchanges, as possibly exacerbated
by MFN provisions.52
Example: the FTC’s analysis in 1998 of the Merck/Medco merger
raised concerns about collusive information exchanges facilitated by the
merger, as well as input foreclosure.53
Relevant information for analyzing this concern includes the following:
 The vulnerability of each market to coordination.54
 Whether the downstream division’s post-merger incentives will be to continue
dealing with upstream firms other than its own upstream division.
 The pre-merger access by the downstream firms to sensitive competitive
information about upstream firms, such as price information.
 The pre-merger access by the upstream firms to sensitive competitive
information about downstream firms, such as price information.
51 As discussed in the exclusionary effects foreclosure, a vertical merger can facilitate coordination
by non-merging firms in the upstream market in response to price increases by the upstream
merging firm as part of an input foreclosure strategy.
52 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. GrafTech Int’l Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-02039
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f264600/264608.pdf
53 Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Merck & Co., Inc. and
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., No. C-3853 (F.T.C. Aug. 27, 1998),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/08/9510097ana.htm.
54 See 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 7.2.
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 An explanation of how the merged firm would or would not be able to use this
information to facilitate coordination after the merger.
 Evaluation of behavior of other integrated firms and its impact on the market.
7.2. Elimination of Disruptive Buyer
A vertical merger can facilitate coordination in the upstream market by eliminating the
incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm to act as a disruptive buyer that
deters coordination by upstream firms.55 After the merger, the merged firm might gain
more net profits from that upstream coordination than it loses downstream by possibly
having higher input costs. Where the downstream firm is a critical disruptive buyer in the
pre-merger market and the upstream market is vulnerable to coordination, this concern
could lead to higher input prices that would harm non-merging downstream firms and
would be passed on to consumers as higher downstream prices.
The following information is relevant to the analysis of this concern:
 The vulnerability of the upstream market to coordination.
 Information regarding whether the downstream division of the merged firm is
acting like a disruptive buyer regarding input purchases in the pre-merger market.
 Information regarding whether the downstream division of the merged firm is
unique disruptive buyer or whether other buyers also act in this way.
7.3. Weakening Maverick or Disruptive Competitive Behavior Downstream
A vertical merger can facilitate coordination in the downstream market by weakening
maverick or other disruptive competitive behavior of a non-merging downstream firm.56 If
a non-merging firm is a maverick or otherwise disruptive competitive influence in the pre-
merger market, the upstream division of the merged firm might weaken the incentives for
that behavior by raising the price it charges to the disruptive firm or reducing its access to
inputs. Alternatively, the downstream division might use customer foreclosure threats to
induce upstream firms to raise their input prices charged to that disruptive firm.
55 These effects are similar to the analysis of the downstream division coercing non-merging
upstream firms to raise prices to its downstream rivals, as discussed in Section 5.2.
56 There is not a similar concern about eliminating the downstream division of the merged firm
acting as a maverick. If the downstream division of the merged firm were a maverick, there
would be no incentive to use the merger to eliminate its maverick behavior, since the
downstream division would be made worse off and the upstream division of the merging firm
would not gain from downstream coordination.
28
The mechanism for this concern can involve targeted input foreclosure or threats of
foreclosure.57 As such, the analysis of this concern follows the analysis of input
foreclosure set out above. In addition to the information generally relevant to evaluating
foreclosure, the following information would be relevant to the analysis of this concern:
 The vulnerability of the downstream market to coordination.
 Information regarding whether one of the non-merging firms has been a maverick in
the output market.
 Information regarding whether the merger would permit the upstream division of the
merged firm to orchestrate higher input prices or other threats to deter this firm’s
maverick behavior.
7.4. Using Lower Costs to Facilitate Consensus or Increase the Ability Punish
Defectors
A vertical merger might facilitate coordination by reducing the costs of the merged firm.
First, if those lower costs could create more symmetry in costs and structure, it may lead
to the firms’ having similar desired prices. Second, obtaining lower costs also may place
the merged firm in a stronger position to punish defectors, which can deter defection.
A significant policy issue involves the fact that challenging a merger based solely on this
effect involves the agency attacking a merger because it reduces the costs of the merged
firm. While the lower costs could facilitate coordination, the theory skates close to an
“efficiency offense.” As a result, the agencies might be reluctant to include it in a revision
to the Vertical Merger Guidelines, except perhaps as a rarely applicable issue.
Example: This effect was alleged in 2001 in the Premdor/Masonite
merger case. The DOJ’s Competitive Impact Statement made the point
that the merger would reduce the costs of the merged firm and lead to
greater cost symmetry between the merged firm and the other vertically
integrated firm.58
The following information would be relevant to evaluation of this cost-symmetry concern:
 Evidence regarding whether the downstream market is vulnerable to
coordination.
57 Because this mechanism involves input foreclosure, it also could be classified as an
exclusionary effect.
58 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Premdor, Inc., No. 1:01-cv-01696 (D.D.C. Aug.
3, 2001), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f9000/9017.pdf.
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 Determining whether the merger increases cost symmetry by reducing costs.
 Determining if lower costs would significantly increase the ability and incentive
to punish defectors from a coordinated agreement or informal understanding.
 Evaluating whether the downward pricing pressure from unilateral effects is
more or less significant than the potential upward pricing from any increased
likelihood of coordination.
8. Evasion of Regulation
A vertical merger might be used to evade price regulation. This concern raises a
potential legal issue. In light of the Court’s analysis in cases like Discon59 and Credit
Suisse,60 it is not entirely clear the extent to which evasion of regulation remains a
viable antitrust cause of action or what limits are placed on the cause of action.
Revisions to the Vertical Merger Guidelines would need to resolve this issue. This
resolution may depend on whether the merger leads to foreclosure or coordination in
addition to pure evasion of the price ceilings intended by the regulations. It also might
depend on whether the regulations preempt antitrust laws entirely. It also might depend
on and whether successful evasion could be rapidly detected and counteracted by the
regulatory agency, whether the regulatory agency has the statutory and practical ability
to punish evasion, and whether any regulatory impediments can be resolved by the
regulator as part of its own merger approval process.
Example: The classic example is the pre-divestiture behavior of AT&T,
which allegedly used its purchases of equipment at inflated prices from
its owned subsidiary, Western Electric, to artificially increase its costs
and so justify higher regulated prices.61
Example: Potential evasion of regulation concerns were raised in the
FTC’s analysis in 2008 of the Fresenius/Daiichi Sankyo exclusive sub-
license for a Daiichi Sankyo pharmaceutical used in Fresenius’ dialysis
clinics, which potentially could allow evasion of Medicare pricing
regulations.62
59 Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
60 Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
61 United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1370–75 (D.D.C. 1981)
62 In the Matter of Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA and Daiichi Sankyo Company, Ltd,
No. 081-0146 (F.T.C. Sept. 15, 2008), available at
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080915freseniusanal.pdf.
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The following information would be relevant to analysis of regulatory evasion concerns:
 Identification of any regulation of the prices or other competitive instruments of
either of the merging firms.
 Determination of whether or not the merger could be used to evade that
regulation, for example, whether cost-plus pricing regulation of the downstream
firm could be evaded by raising the input price charged by the upstream division
of the merged firm, or whether the regulations could be evaded by selling the
products of the merging firms on a bundled basis.
 Evaluation of whether the evasion would be so costly to the merged firm that it
would be unprofitable.
 Evaluation of whether the regulatory agency has the ability to review the merger
and assess the merger’s potential impact on regulatory evasion itself.
 Evaluation of whether rapid detection and penalties levied by the regulatory
agency would deter attempted regulatory evasion.
9. Harmful Price Discrimination
A vertical merger might permit a firm with pre-existing market power to price
discriminate more effectively in the downstream market and harm a targeted groups of
consumers.63 To price discriminate, a firm must be able to identify targeted customers
and prevent arbitrage. As noted in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this
sometimes can be done by creating product differences and pricing plans that lead
consumers to self-sort while preventing effective arbitrage.64 By doing so, the merged
firm in effect may gain additional market power over the targeted consumer group.65
This concern raises two potential legal and policy issues. First, if a vertical merger leads
to lower prices for some consumers and higher prices for others, the consumers
targeted for the price increase likely would comprise a separate market under the
63 More effective price discrimination does not always harm consumers. It is possible that it
would permit a new product to be introduced. Sometimes it could lead to lower prices for some
consumers without raising the prices to other consumers. These types of beneficial price
discrimination would represent an efficiency benefit.
64 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §3.
65 The agencies would explain how competition for the targeted consumer group is lessened by
eliminating their ability to benefit from the competition for the non-targeted consumers.
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hypothetical monopolist test.66 Therefore, there is a legal issue of whether the benefits
to the other consumers could be counted under Philadelphia National Bank. The policy
issue is partially resolved in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines according to
whether the benefits are inextricably linked and large, relative to the harms. However,
this analysis may involve significant analytic and empirical difficulties in determining
whether more effective price discrimination will be harmful or beneficial.
Second, this concern involves the merger leading to the increased exercise of pre-
existing market power, rather than achieving or maintaining market power. It
sometimes has been argued that tying should be attacked only when it extends or
maintains the market power of the tying product, rather than when it simply permits the
firm to exercise its market power more fully.67 However, in the case of a merger, the
agencies would be challenging the merger that facilitates the exercise of market power
through price discrimination, not the price discrimination itself.
Example: Price discrimination concerns were raised by the DOJ in
1995 in its review of the Sprint/Deutsche Telecom joint venture.68
The following information would be relevant to the evaluation of harmful price
discrimination concerns:
 Evaluation of whether the merger would facilitate customer sorting or prevent
arbitrage by increasing information or by bundling the sale of complementary
products.
 Evaluation of whether the discrimination likely would lead to lower prices for
some consumers, and if so, the relative impacts on each group, or whether the
discrimination likely would lead to lower prices for all consumers.
 Evaluation of whether the discrimination likely would lead to higher or lower total
output.
66 This article follows the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §10 in focusing on harm to
consumers, rather than total welfare. As stated there, “the Agencies are mindful that the
antitrust laws give competition, not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting
customers.”
67 See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction v. Extension: The Basis for
Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285,
298 (2008)
68 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Sprint Corp., No. 95-cv-1304 (D.D.C. July
13,1995), available at www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f0400/0452.pdf.
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10. Competitive Benefits
A vertical merger may generate cognizable efficiency benefits that can lead to increased
competition and, as a result, reverse potential anticompetitive impacts or deter the
conduct that raises those concerns. In markets that are vulnerable to coordination, a
vertical merger might reduce the likelihood of coordinated effects by the creation or
enhancement of a maverick, or it might disrupt oligopoly coordination by decreasing the
incentives to coordinate.
10.1. Cognizable Efficiency Benefits
A vertical merger potentially can generate a variety of efficiency benefits from vertical
cooperation that improves communication flows and harmonizes the incentives of the
merging firms. The benefits can include cost reductions and improved product design
that can lead to lower prices, higher quality products, and increased investment. By
reducing the cost of inputs used by the downstream division of the merged firm, a vertical
merger also can create incentives for price reductions.
A typical vertical merger often is presumed to have greater efficiency benefits than a
typical horizontal merger. However, there are many situations where vertical integration
does not lead to efficiency benefits. Some types of efficiencies also may be more
difficult to achieve than in a horizontal merger because the acquiring firm may lack
expertise about the technology and business of the acquired firm. Thus, it cannot be
assumed that significant cognizable efficiencies would occur in every vertical merger.
Nor can it be assumed that efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse likely
competitive harms.
In deciding whether efficiency benefits are cognizable, the analysis would follow the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in evaluating whether the claimed efficiencies are merger-
specific, verifiable, and involve procompetitive effects.
10.1.1. Cost and Quality Efficiencies
By reducing costs or increasing quality, the merged firm would obtain a unilateral
incentive to reduce its quality-adjusted prices, all else held constant. This downward
pricing pressure could offset or reverse the upward pricing pressure from the various
sources of harms. Evaluation of these efficiencies would largely be the same as in the
context of horizontal mergers.
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this issue:
 If other firms in the market are integrated, evaluation of whether those integrated
firms are generally more efficient and why.
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 Identification of any expertise about the market by the downstream division of the
merged firm that can be better shared with the upstream division of the merged
firm if they are merged, or vice versa.
 Explanation of whether and how information flows will improve if the firms are
merged.
 Explanation of any practical impediments to achieving these benefits absent the
merger.
 Evaluation of whether any of these effects would lead to higher costs or reduced
quality or services provided to other firms.
 Evaluation of any possible cost increases or other inefficiencies created by
vertical integration, such as inefficient favoritism of inputs sold by the upstream
division or greater complexity in dealing with firms that are now competitors.
 Evaluation of whether these benefits would be sufficient to reverse the potential
for competitive harms.
10.1.2. Elimination of Double Marginalization
Vertical mergers may lead to efficiency benefits when the upstream division of the
merged firm charges a pre-merger price to the downstream division that exceeds its
marginal costs. In this situation, the merger can lead the downstream division to treat
the real resource cost of this input as equal to the marginal cost, regardless of the
nominal input price charged by the upstream division. That reduction in the perceived
real resource cost of the input can lead to the incentive to reduce its downstream prices.
Economists refer to this mechanism by the term “elimination of double marginalization.”
It is sometimes argued that this prospect of this downward pricing pressure from
elimination of double marginalization is a strong policy rationale to forgo all, or almost
all, enforcement actions against vertical mergers. However, there are a number of
strong economic reasons why elimination of double marginalization may be insufficient
to trump the anticompetitive harms in some cases.
First, the downstream division’s opportunity cost may not equal marginal cost. This
reason relates to the unilateral incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm
to raise price as a way to increase the profits of the upstream division. As discussed
above, this incentive flows from the benefits to the upstream division of selling more
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inputs to rivals when the downstream division raises it price.69 This effect can reduce or
reverse the effects of elimination of double marginalization.
Second, the upstream division of the merged firm and downstream division of the
merged firm already may have a complex contract or relationship in the pre-merger
world which already reduces or eliminates double marginalization. This may involve a
two-part tariff or complex pricing such that the downstream firm pays a price equal to or
close to marginal cost on incremental units. Alternatively, it may involve quantity-forcing
purchase requirements that lead to equivalent results.
Third, elimination of double marginalization benefits may not be merger-specific. It may
be practical to arrange a contract as described above that achieves this benefit in the
future without the merger.
Fourth, it may not be economical for the downstream division of the merged to use the
inputs of the upstream division of the merged firm because of product incompatibility or
other reasons, in which case double marginalization would not be eliminated.70
Fifth, agency costs may lead some integrated companies to have their divisions treat
one another at arm’s length, in order to dampen competition or to compensate
executives according to their performance and maintain the managerial efficiency of
each division, which again would suggest that double marginalization would not be
eliminated.
All these reasons would suggest a policy by which this factor should be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis along with other potential efficiency benefits and weighed against
the prospect of competitive harms, just as is done for horizontal mergers.
Example: In Comcast/NBCU, both the FCC and the DOJ were skeptical of the
claims that the merger would eliminate double marginalization because of pre-
merger contractual terms and the opportunity cost (unilateral incentives) issue.
Example: In AT&T/McCaw, McCaw’s existing network infrastructure was
incompatible with AT&T’s network equipment, so any elimination of double
marginalization effect would be delayed.71
In some cases, these effects might be predicted from natural experiments arising from
previous vertical mergers. When there is sufficient data available, elimination of double
69 Supra Section 6.
70 For example, See Enghin Atalay et. al., Vertical Integration and Input Flows, 104 AM. ECON.
REV. 1120 (April 2014).
71 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. AT&T Corp., No. 1:94-cv-01555 (D.D.C. July
15, 1994), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1994-08-26/html/94-20948.htm.
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marginalization effects can be estimated and combined with the vGUPPId arising from
the unilateral pricing incentives of the downstream division of the merged firm in order to
evaluate the direction and magnitude of the net effect.72
The following information would be relevant to evaluating elimination of double
marginalization benefits claims:
 Identification of whether the upstream division of the merged firm sells inputs
to the downstream division of the merged firm.
 Determination of whether the downstream merged firm would have the ability
and incentive to substitute away from input purchases from non-merging
firms to the inputs of the upstream division.
 Identification of the pre-merger incremental profit margin on input sales by
the upstream division of the merged firm to the downstream division of the
merged firm, in order to measure the potential magnitude of the beneficial
effect.
 Identification of whether the firms currently have a complex contract (e.g.,
with a two-part tariff or quantity-forcing provisions) that reduces or eliminates
double marginalization inefficiencies.
 If they do not currently have such a contract, explanation of the reasons why
the firms were unable to negotiate one and whether there are impediments
other than the prospect of the merger to implementing such a complex
contract in the future.
 If the upstream merging firm already is integrated in other ways,
determination of the way in which inputs are priced to downstream divisions
and how downstream divisions take those input costs into account in their
decision-making.
 Evaluation of whether the merged firm’s incentive to reduce the downstream
price would be mitigated (or even reversed) by the fact that a reduction in the
downstream price would reduce the profits earned by the upstream division
of the merged firm on input sales to other downstream firms.
 Evaluation of the internal transfer prices and pricing practices of other
integrated firms in the industry.
72 Supra Section 6.
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10.1.3. Increased Investment Incentives
Improved vertical cooperation from a vertical merger might lead to greater investment.
One reason is that the merger can improve communication and coordination between
firms at different levels of production. A merger also can “internalize” the spillover
benefits that investment by one of the firms has on the profitability of the other.73 The
merger also can spur investment by reducing the risk of hold-up. This risk can occur
when one firm has to sink costs in anticipation of a long-term relationship with the other
and there is fear of hold-up problems that cannot be resolved with a long term contract.
In such cases, common ownership through a vertical merger may be necessary for the
investments to be profitable. In rare circumstances, an improvement in the ability to
price discriminate might facilitate a rapid increase in investment, so that consumers
would be benefited on balance.
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this potential benefit:
 Determining the magnitude of the spillover effects.
 Determining why the parties have been unable to or cannot internalize these
spillover effects with cost sharing or a limited joint venture, and whether that type
of cost sharing or limited joint venture might create anticompetitive effects of its
own.
 Identification of long-term investments that are subject to hold-up by its
contracting partners.
 Evaluation of the impediments to eliminating this hold-up through contractual
arrangements rather than a merger (e.g., transaction costs or inability to
sufficiently specify contractual terms).
 Determination of the investment levels that would occur absent the merger.
 Evaluation of the harm to consumers and competition that would occur as a
result of the reduced investment.
73 For example, suppose that one of the firms has a potential investment that would cost $100
and increase the NPV of its profits by $80. Suppose it also would increase the NPV of the other
firm’s profits by $30. The joint profits ($110) of this investment cover the investment costs
($100). However, the first firm would not be willing to undertake this investment unless the
other firm shared the cost and such cost-sharing might face practical impediments. These
impediments could include bargaining behavior and limited information and control, which can
lead to free rider issues.
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10.2. Reduced Likelihood of Coordination
While a vertical merger can increase the likelihood coordination,74 it also may have the
opposite effect in some circumstances and reduce the likelihood of coordination. The
efficiency benefits of the merger or the structure of the merged firm may lead to the
creation of a maverick firm. A vertical merger also may eliminate certain features of the
pre-merger market that made successful coordinated behavior more likely.
The following information would be relevant to evaluating this potential procompetitive
effect:
 Magnitude of merger-specific cost reductions or quality improvements, including
elimination of double marginalization.
 Degree to which the pre-merger downstream market is vulnerable to or subject to
coordination.
 Explanation of whether the elimination of downstream coordination would benefit
the merged firm on balance.
 Evaluation of whether cost reductions or other benefits would increase the
incentives of the merged firm to become a maverick in the downstream market.
 Explanation of whether the merged firm would have a greater ability to provide
discounts without being detected, for example, by virtue of its participation in the
downstream market as a vertically integrated firm.
 Explanation of whether the change in market structure would make it more
difficult for other upstream firms to observe the merged firm’s level of upstream
output or price.
 Explanation of whether the merged firm would have a greater incentive to
differentiate its product than before the merger.
 Evaluation of whether the merger would lead to greater cost asymmetry and
thereby complicate reaching consensus on a coordinated price.
11. Complementary Product Mergers
The competitive effects analysis of complementary product mergers is very similar to
the analysis of vertical mergers. As a matter of economics, the goods and services
produced by firms at different levels of production (as in a vertical merger) are
complements to one another. Complementary products sometimes are combined into
74 See Section 7.
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packages and sold by one of firms, so they present as a vertical structure with the
packaging firm treated as downstream.75 At other times, complementary products are
sold separately and combined into packages by customers. In these cases, the
identification of which product is upstream and which is downstream is a matter of
convenience in explaining the theories of harms and benefits.76
The competitive concerns and benefits from complementary product mergers generally
have straightforward analogues in the vertical merger context.77 However, some issues
may be described differently or may present themselves with different conduct than they
would in the context of a vertical merger. These differences can lead to confusion or
controversy.78
Foreclosure concerns may involve conduct that appears different in form but is
analytically identical or very similar. Like a vertical merger, a complementary products
merger may involve a price increase for one of the components. However, the conduct
might present itself differently as higher prices for purchasing the complementary
products on an unbundled basis than for a bundle. Instead of an outright refusal to sell
the upstream product, as may result from a vertical merger, a complementary products
merger may involve a refusal to sell via post-merger product incompatibility. Or it may
be implemented with physical or contractual tying, whereby the merged firm sells the
75 For example, a customer planning a ski vacation can separately purchase the air travel, hotel,
and lift ticket components separately or from a tour operator that does the packaging. Or, the
customer might purchase the package from the airline, which separately purchases the hotel and
lift ticket on a wholesale market.
76 One seeming difference between the analysis of vertical and complementary product mergers is
that a final customer may want to purchase only one of the complementary components. For
example, the customer planning a ski vacation may drive to the resort and so have no need for an
airline ticket. However, this also can occur in the vertical merger context. A downstream firm
similarly may engineer its product so that it does not use the input produced by the upstream
division of the merging firms or its direct competitors. For example, electrically powered
automobiles do not use fuel injectors or spark plugs.
77 The potential competitive harms discussed here should be distinguished from the so-called
“entrenchment theory” in complementary products mergers. Under that theory, the efficiencies
from the transaction might lead the merged firm to capture sales from its rivals sufficient to
cause those rivals to exit. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967). This
“efficiencies offense” is no longer typically treated as a cognizable theory of harm in the U.S.
See, e.g., Speech, Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision (Nov. 29, 2001), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.htm.
78 The proper characterization and treatment of complementary product mergers raised some
controversy in the ABA Report at 8-9.
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one component to consumers only in a system or package with the other component
produced by the merged firm.
Concerns about reduction in potential competition also can raise product incompatibility
concerns in the complementary product merger context. To raise barriers to entry to
firms that would produce only a single component, the merged firm might make its
products incompatible with the likely designs of potential entrants or it might design
proprietary interfaces.
In a complementary product merger where one of the firms assembles the products into
a package to sell to consumers, elimination of double marginalization might be seen as
identical as it would be in a vertical merger. In contrast, when complementary
components are sold directly to consumers, the elimination of double marginalization
may create an incentive for the merged firm to set lower prices only if the firms’
complementary products are purchased as a bundle.
It has been suggested that enforcement policy towards complementary product mergers
should be different, at least with respect to the exclusionary effects concerns.79 For
example, it has been suggested that the agencies should wait and bring an enforcement
action against anticompetitive exclusionary conduct under Section 1 or Section 2, only if
and when the conduct is attempted in the future. This will be another policy issue that
revised Guidelines will have to resolve.
While relying solely on post-merger enforcement might have appealing simplicity, it
obscures several key facts that favor immediate enforcement under Section 7.
 The benefit of HSR review is to prevent the delays and remedial issues inherent
in after-the-fact enforcement. Consumers would suffer harms during the interim
until liability has been established and a remedy put into place. The ability of the
merged firm to delay resolution of the matter could entail a long lag before the
harm is remedied.
 There may be severe problems in remedying the concern. It may be too late to
unwind the merger. Moreover, by the time the case reaches the remedy stage,
the market structure may have irreversibly changed. Therefore, the only possible
remedy might be for the antitrust agencies and the courts to engage in long term
direct regulation of the prices, quality, and product designs of the merged firm, a
task that they are not well-suited to undertake.
 Section 1 and Section 2 legal standards are more permissive than Section 7
standards. Those statutes do not reflect the incipiency and detection concerns
79 ABA Report at 8-9.
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that drove the adoption and implementation of Section 7. Those standards also
may reflect greater concerns about deterring procompetitive unilateral conduct
for a single entity, as well as concerns about the workability of remedies that are
not present in the context of analyzing a merger. For example, administrative
and other concerns that have led to more permissive Section 2 standards with
respect to enforcing rules against anticompetitive refusals to deal.80 Some courts
similarly have adopted standards for bundle pricing with above-cost safe harbors
that are similar to predatory pricing standards and that would permit unbundled
component price increases (i.e., bundle discounts) without fear of liability in
markets with significant margins.81 Product incompatibility also might be subject
to a very permissive standard unless it can be shown that the incompatibility
lacks any efficiency benefits.82
 The agencies might well argue that anticompetitive post-merger conduct was
caused by the merger agreement, so that it would be covered by Section 7.
However, this interpretation also might be a contentious issue with an uncertain
outcome.
All in all, failure to address these kinds of issues in the context of merger review could
lead to significant consumer harm and underdeterrence. Thus, there are strong policy
reasons not to rely on post-merger enforcement for concerns that are raised by
complementary product mergers. At the same time, pre-merger enforcement decisions
ought to be based on inferences from reliable evidence, not speculation.
12. Partial Ownership Acquisitions
Partial acquisitions can raise competitive concerns when they involve vertical or
complementary products.83 As with horizontal mergers, the analysis would examine the
impact of the acquisition on the incentives of both firms and any exchanges of
information entailed by the partial ownership interest. Even if the ownership interest is
passive, competitive concerns may still occur as a result of the acquiring firm sharing in
the profits of the acquired firm. For example, the downstream division still may have an
incentive (albeit a somewhat reduced one) to raise its price, because some of the lost
sales are now recaptured via increased input sales made by the upstream division. A
80 Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–15
(2004).
81 E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
82 E.g., Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979).
83 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 13.
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similar analysis would apply to price increases by the upstream division. A partial
ownership interest also might affect the ability and incentive of the parties to achieve
certain efficiency benefits.
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Appendix: Vertical Merger Challenges (1994–2013)
Year Case Description Vertical Theoryof Harm Remedy
2013 In re Nielsen
Holdings N.V.i
Nielsen Holdings N.V., a leading global media measurement
and research company that provided television, online,
mobile, and cross-platform measurement services, proposed
to acquire Arbitron Inc., a media measurement and research
company specializing in radio data. The FTC alleged that the
merger eliminated potential competition in the “future market”
of hybrid, cross-platform media data, because the two







Consent Decree required Nielsen (1)
to divest Arbitron’s in-development
cross-platform audience
measurement business; and (2) to
perpetually license current and the
next eight years of data from




General Electric Co. (“GE”) proposed to acquire the aviation
business of Avio S.p.A., which designed and manufactured
component parts for aircraft engines, including parts used in
Pratt & Whitney’s engine for the Airbus A320neo. Through a
joint venture, GE manufactured the only other competing
engine option for the A320neo. The FTC alleged that GE
could disrupt the design and certification of the Avio-supplied
parts for the Pratt & Whitney engine to favor the competitive
position of GE’s own engine.
Input foreclosure Consent Decree incorporated portions
of the original contract between Avio
and Pratt & Whitney regarding the
agreement to develop the engine
components and restricted GE from
interfering with the Avio team working
on the project.
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Appendix: Vertical Merger Challenges (1994–2013)




Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. (“GE”), NBC, and Navy,
LLC formed a joint venture of broadcast and cable network
assets. Comcast, the largest cable provider, would have
majority control of the JV containing NBC’s popular video
programming. The DOJ and FCC alleged the combined
entity could withhold or raise the price of NBC content to
Comcast’s rival multichannel video programming distributors
(“MPVDs”) or online video programming distributors (“OVDs”)
to reduce their ability to compete with Comcast, as Comcast
had done in the past with its RSN network. Additionally,
Comcast could refuse to carry competitor channels of NBC to
reduce their ability to compete against NBC. The DOJ
rejected claims that the transaction would eliminate double
marginalization as not, or at least not entirely, merger specific
because the industry had already successfully done so





Final Judgment required the JV (1) to
license its broadcast, cable, and film
content to OVDs on terms comparable
to those on which it licensed to
MVPDs and to those the OVD
received from a competitor of the JV;
(2) to relinquish its voting rights in the
Hulu joint venture (an OVD); (3) to not
use certain restrictive license terms
with OVDs; (4) to not unreasonably
discriminate in the transmission of
lawful content through its internet
service, including by exempting its
own services from data caps; and (5)
to supply MVPDs with the JV’s
programming content and submit to






GrafTech International Ltd., a manufacturer of graphite
electrodes, proposed to acquire Seadrift Coke L.P., a
manufacturer of petroleum needle coke, a key input in the
graphite electrodes. The DOJ alleged it would provide
Seadrift with direct access to competitors’ pricing and product
information through GrafTech’s supply agreements and
most–favored-nation provisions with Seadrift’s competitors,
particularly Conoco Phillips Co., ultimately facilitating the




Final Judgment required the
combined entity (1) to amend its
supply agreement to competitor
Conoco to remove ongoing audit
rights, sharing of confidential
information, and MFN pricing; (2) to
not enter into similar terms with
Conoco for ten years; and (3) to
firewall personnel deciding Seadrift’s
pricing and production from Conoco’s
competitively sensitive information.
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Appendix: Vertical Merger Challenges (1994–2013)
Year Case Description Vertical Theoryof Harm Remedy
United States
v. Google Inc.v
Google Inc. proposed to acquire ITA Software Inc., the
developer and licenser of QPX software, which was used by
airlines, travel agents, and online travel intermediaries
(“OTIs”) to provide customized flight searches. Google
intended to offer an online travel search that would compete
with OTIs, many of which used QPX. The DOJ alleged that
Google could deny OTIs access to or raise their price for
QPX software. Additionally, the DOJ alleged that Google
could gain access to competitively sensitive information from







Final Judgment required Google (1) to
honor existing QPX licenses; (2) to
renew existing licenses under similar
terms and conditions; (3) to offer
licenses to other online travel
intermediaries on reasonable, non-
discriminatory terms and submit to
binding arbitration over those terms;
(4) to devote substantially the same
amount of resources to R&D for QPX
as ITA did before the merger; (5) to
not use certain restrictive terms in its
agreements with airlines and OTIs;
and (6) to firewall OTIs’ competitively
sensitive information from personnel
involved in Google’s travel search
service.
2010 In re Coca-
Cola Co.vi
The Coca-Cola Co. (“Coke”) proposed to acquire its largest
bottler, Coca-Cola Enterprises (“CCE”), and an exclusive
license to bottle and distribute all Dr. Pepper Snapple Group
(“Dr Pepper”) brands that CCE formerly distributed. The FTC
alleged that to carry out distribution activities, Coke would
have access to Dr Pepper’s commercially sensitive
information and could misuse that information to exclude








Consent Decree limited access to Dr
Pepper’s commercially sensitive
information to Coke employees who
perform traditional bottler functions.
In re PepsiCo,
Inc.vii
PepsiCo, Inc. proposed to acquire two of its bottler/distributor
companies and an exclusive license from Dr. Pepper
Snapple Group (“Dr Pepper”) to bottle, distribute and sell
brands in certain territories that these two companies
formerly sold. The FTC alleged that to carry out distribution
activities, Pepsi would have access to Dr Pepper’s
commercially sensitive information and could misuse that








Consent Decree limited access to Dr
Pepper’s commercially sensitive
information to Pepsi employees who
perform traditional bottler functions.
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Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., the largest U.S. primary
ticketing company, proposed to merge with Live Nation, Inc.,
the largest concert promoter in the U.S. and the owner of
multiple concert venues. Before the merger, Live Nation had
licensed primary-ticketing technology from CTS Eventim AG
(“CTS”) and secured contracts with venues representing 15%
of major concert venue capacity. The DOJ alleged a
horizontal loss of competition and potential competition for
primary ticketing services and vertical theories that the
merger would eliminate Live Nation and Ticketmaster as
facilitators of entry into one another’s primary markets and
that the merger would allow Live Nation and Ticketmaster to
exclude competitors by bundling primary ticketing services
with access to artists promoted by Live Nation. The DOJ
rejected claims that the merger would eliminate double
marginalization as not merger specific, because the firms










The DOJ required Ticketmaster (1) to
license its platform software used to
sell tickets to Anschutz Entertainment
Group, Inc. (“AEG”) and give AEG the
option to acquire a copy of the source
code after four years; (2) to not ticket
AEG venues after four years to incent
AEG to take that option; and (3) to
divest its Paciolan “self-ticketing”






Fresenius Medical Care Ag & Co. KGaA, a provider of
dialysis services and owner of dialysis clinics, proposed to
acquire an exclusive sublicense from Daiichi Sankyo
Company to manufacture and supply Venofer, an iron
deficiency treatment for dialysis patients, to independent
outpatient dialysis clinics in the U.S. The FTC alleged that
Fresenius could inflate its Medicare reimbursements by
increasing the prices it charged in its own clinics. Revisions
to Medicare reimbursement regulations taking effect in 2012
would eliminate this distortion.
Evasion of
regulation
Consent Decree required Fresenius to
report an intra-company transfer price
below the level set by the FTC, which
was derived from current market
prices, until the revised regulations
took effect.
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Monsanto Co., a leading provider of in-cottonseed traits,
proposed to acquire Delta and Pine Land Co. (“DPL”), a large
supplier of “traited cottonseed” that worked with biotech
companies to develop cotton seed traits. Monsanto and DPL
originally partnered to develop the most commonly used
“traited cottonseed,” with Monsanto developing the traits and
DPL manufacturing the seeds and paying a license fee to
Monsanto. Before the merger, DPL had begun an effort to
replace Monsanto traits in DPL cottonseed with similar traits
developed by competitors of Monsanto. Monsanto had in
turn begun an effort to manufacture cottenseeds by acquiring
Stoneville Pedigree Seed Company (“Stoneville”), a
competitor of DPL. The DOJ challenged the merger, alleging
a horizontal loss of competition between DPL and Stoneville
and a vertical theory that DPL would refuse to partner with







Final Judgment required the merged
entity to divest certain promising
cottonseed development lines, trait
technology, and forty DPL cottonseed
breeding lines, and to modify
Monsanto’s seed company licenses.
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Boeing Corp., a global aerospace company and supplier to
the Department of Defense, and Lockheed Martin Corp., the
largest defense contractor in the U.S., were competing
providers of medium-to-heavy (“MTH”) launch services and of
space vehicles. They proposed to form a joint venture to
consolidate their government launch-service and space-
vehicle businesses. The FTC alleged that the JV could
refuse to provide launch services to competing space vehicle
providers, in particular for packaged price procurement of the
two services known as “delivery in orbit.” Additionally, the
FTC alleged that the companies might share confidential
information obtained through launch vehicle services with
their respective space vehicle businesses, and vice-versa.
The FTC also alleged that the transaction would lead to a
horizontal loss of competition between the merging parties’
MTH launch services and space vehicles, but accepted the
Department of Defense’s finding that the increased launch







Consent Decree required (1) the JV
to cooperate on equal terms with all
providers of government space
vehicles; (2) Boeing and Lockheed to
equally consider the JV’s launch
service competitors in government
delivery in orbit procurement; and (3)
the JV, Boeing, and Lockheed to
establish firewalls to prevent access






Northrop Grumman Corp., one of two suppliers of certain
payloads for reconnaissance satellite programs, proposed to
acquire TRW, Inc., a company with the ability to act as a
prime contractor on reconnaissance satellite programs that
use these products. The DOJ alleged the company could
deny competitors access to its prime contractor or payload
capabilities. Additionally, it would provide the entity access to









Final Judgment required Northrop (1)
to select payloads on a non-
discriminatory basis when it had
already been selected as the prime
contractor; and (2) to offer its
payloads to all competing prime
contractors on a non-discriminatory
basis when it was competing to be the
prime contractor.
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2002 In re America
Online, Inc.xiii
America Online, Inc. (“AOL”), a global narrowband and
broadband internet service provider (“ISP”), proposed to
merge with Time Warner Inc., a cable television distributor
and broadband ISP. Before the merger, AOL had recently
launched AOL TV, a first-generation interactive television
(“ITV”) service delivered through local cable providers. The
FTC alleged a horizontal loss of competition between AOL
and Time Warner in broadband internet access and vertical
theories that the combined firm would have the ability and
incentive to block or deter rival ITV providers from competing
with AOL TV through its cable system. Additionally, the FTC
was concerned that the merged entity would foreclose
competing ISPs from providing cable broadband ISP service





Consent Decree required the merged
firm (1) to not make AOL broadband
available in a cable service area until
Earthlink, a competitor, was able to
offer cable internet service in that
area; (2) to enter agreements to carry
two other non-affiliated cable ISPs in
that area within 90 days of offering
AOL broadband service; (3) to not
interfere the ability of a subscriber to
access competing ITV services; and
(4) to charge a comparable price for
AOL DSL service in Time Warner
Service areas as outside those areas.
In re Cytyc
Corp.xiv
Cytyc Corp., a manufacturer of liquid-based pap smear tests
for cervical cancer, proposed to acquire Digene Corp., the
only seller of a DNA-based test for human papillomavirus
(“HPV”). Doctors conducted HPV tests from the sample
obtained by the liquid-based pap smear. The FTC alleged
that Cytyc could foreclose its pap smear competitors by
limiting access to Digene’s HPV test. The FTC also alleged
that the merger would eliminate Digene’s incentive to
continue pursuing FDA approval for its HPV test to be used
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Premdor Inc., the largest global manufacturer of interior
molded doors and a small producer of molded door skins,
proposed to acquire Masonite Corp., a manufacturer of
molded door skins and fiberboard, the primary input for
molded door skins. Premdor had recently entered the
production of molded door skins and, although it was
relatively small, had used its potential to expand to negotiate
discounts from Masonite. The DOJ alleged a horizontal loss
of competition in the sale of molded door skins and vertical
theories that the elimination of the threat of Premdor’s
expansion in molded door skins allowed enhanced
coordination upstream and downstream and that the merger
would lead to lower costs and greater cost symmetry
between the merged firm and another vertically integrated















Final Judgment required Premdor to
divest its Towanda facility, which
engaged in the production of molded
door skins, creating a new upstream
competitor.




Entergy Corporation, a generator, transmitter, and distributor
of electricity, proposed to form a joint venture with Entergy-
Koch, LP with Koch Industries, Inc., which owned an
electricity derivatives trading company and the Gulf South
pipeline. The JV would combine Entergy’s subsidiary that
markets electricity and gas with Koch Industries’ electricity
derivatives trading company and the Gulf South pipeline.
The FTC alleged that, as a result of Entergy’s exclusive legal
right to sell electricity in Louisiana and Mississippi and
recover 100% of the costs from those states’ electricity
producers and the acquisition, Entergy would have the
incentive to purchase gas transportation services from the
Gulf South pipeline at an inflated price.
Evasion of
regulation
Consent Decree required Entergy to
establish a competitive bidding
process for its sourcing of gas
transportation services.
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2000 In re Ceridian
Corp.xvii
Ceridian Corp., a provider of fleet-card services to over-the-
road trucking companies, acquired Trendar Corp, a provider
of fuel purchase desk automation systems used to process
fleet card transactions. The FTC alleged that Ceridian could
deny rival fleet-card services access to Trendar’s system or
grant access to them only on discriminatory terms. The FTC
also alleged that Ceridian could deny rival fuel purchase desk
automation systems the ability to process Ceridian cards.
(The FTC learned of the non-reportable acquisition of
Trendar during Ceridian’s 1998 acquisition of a competing








Consent Order required Ceridian (1)
to provide ten-year licenses to
Trendar fuel purchase desk
automation systems to rival fleet-card
providers; (2) to pay for a third-party
software developer of the
Commission’s choice to implement
interoperability between Trendar’s
system and rival fleet-card providers’
networks; and (3) to provide ten-year
licenses to rival fuel purchaser desk
automation system suppliers to
process Ceridian’s fleet cards on the
same terms as Trendar systems were
able to process Ceridian fleet cards.
In re Boeing
Companyxviii
Boeing Company, a supplier of launch vehicles and a
contractor bidding for a certain classified Department of
Defense classified program, proposed to acquire certain
space-related assets of General Motors Corporation,
including satellite production and a systems engineering and
technical assistance (“SETA”) for a certain classified
Department of Defense program. The FTC alleged that
Boeing would (1) use its position as the SETA contractor for
the classified program to favor its own bid or to obtain
competitively sensitive information about competitors’ bids;
(2) access rival satellite producers’ competitively sensitive
information through its launch vehicle business; (3) access
rival launch vehicle providers’ competitively sensitive
information through its satellite business; and (4) withhold
satellite interface information necessary to use Boeing’s










Consent Decree required Boeing (1)
to firewall competitively sensitive
information of rival bidders it received
in its capacity as a SETA contractor;
(2) to provider certain documentation
and transition services to the
Department of Defense to enable it to
transition SETA for the program away
from Boeing; (3) to firewall
competitively sensitive information of
satellite rivals’ obtained through
Boeing’s launch services; and (4) to
provide certain interface information
for its satellites to rival launch services
providers.
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Enova Corp., an electric utility provider in San Diego, and
Pacific Enterprises, a major provider of natural gas
transportation services to gas-fired plants and of natural gas
storage in California, proposed to merge. The DOJ alleged
that the Pacific would have the ability and incentive following
the merger to deny access to or raise the price of its natural
gas transportation services for rival electricity producers.
California regulations establishing marginal-unit pricing for all
electricity would magnify this effect.
Input foreclosure Final Judgment required the merged
firm to divest all low-cost gas
generators that would likely provide
the firm with the incentive to raise
electricity prices. It allowed Enova to
keep higher-cost generators because
these would be active insufficiently
frequently for a downstream increase
in price to outweigh an upstream loss
of sales.




Barnes and Noble, Inc. (“B&N”), a book retailer, proposed to
merge with Ingram Book Group, a book wholesaler. Before
the transaction, B&N had announced publicly that it
considered providing wholesale services to retailers. The
FTC alleged a horizontal loss of potential competition in book
wholesaling and vertical theory that B&N could restrict
access or raise prices of books to competing retailers. The
FTC also alleged that B&N would could gain access to rivals’
competitively sensitive information through Ingram which














Provident Companies, Inc. and UNUM Corporation, both
providers of insurance for individual disability policies,
proposed to merge. It was common practice in the industry
for insurers to supply one another with actuarial data through
an industry association to assist in determining the risk of
individuals for particular injuries. The FTC alleged that the
combined firm would no longer have the incentive to provide
this data to rivals, as it would have sufficient scale that the
competitive harm to rivals would outweigh the reduction in its
own ability to assess its insureds’ risk.
Input foreclosure Consent Decree required the merged
firm to provide its actuarial data to
rivals through an industry association
for 20 years.
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In re Merck &
Co, Inc.xxii
Merck & Co., a pharmaceutical manufacturer, acquired
Medco Manage Care, L.L.C. in 1993, a provider of pharmacy
benefit management (“PBM”) services. The FTC alleged that
Merck could (1) foreclose rival pharmaceutical manufacturers
from Medco’s drug formulary; (2) Merck would have access
to competitors’ proprietary information through the PBM
services; and (3) Medco would be eliminated as an













Consent Decree required Merck: (1)
to establish an independent
Pharmacy and Theraputics committee
to determine which drugs would
qualify for an “open formulary” it was
required to maintain; (2) to accept all
discounts offered by other drug
manufacturers on the open formulary
and reflect those discounts in their
products’ ranking on the open
formulary; and (3) to firewall from
Merck and Medco the competitively





CMS Energy Corporation (“CMS”), which owned a
combination electric and gas utility serving broad sections of
Michigan, proposed to acquire the Panhandle Eastern and
Trunkline pipelines from Duke Energy. Before the merger,
CMS had natural gas interconnections with other rival
pipelines. The FTC alleged that CMS would have an
incentive to close its interconnection or reduce its
interconnection capacity available to other pipelines,
increasing demand on the Panhandle Eastern and Trunkline
pipelines and enabling them to raise their rates.
Input foreclosure Consent Decree required CMS (1) to
maintain a designated level of
interconnection capacity based on
historical usage levels; and (2) offer
shippers the ability to break contracts
and interconnect with another pipeline
or to tap CMS’s own account to
supply gas if the available
interconnection capacity is less than
actual capacity.
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SBC Communications, Inc. (“SBC”), a provider of local
exchange, long distance, and wireless mobile telephone
services, proposed to acquire Ameritech Corporation, a
provider of wireless mobile telephone services. Before the
merger, Ameritech had planned to enter the provision of local
exchange and long distance services in a bundle with
Ameritech’s wireless service in St. Louis. The DOJ alleged
that, as a result of the acquisition, Ameritech would no longer
have the incentive to offer a bundle of Ameritech’s wireless
services with the local exchange and long-distance services
in competition with SBC. The DOJ also alleged a horizontal
loss of competition in markets where both SBC and







Final Judgment required SBC to
divest its cellular business and all
assets involved in its planned entry
into St. Louis, as well as assets to





Dominion Resources, Inc., an electricity provider, proposed
to acquire Consolidated Natural Gas Co., a distributor of
natural gas, one of the fuels used to generate electricity. The
FTC alleged that Dominion could use its control over the
available source of natural gas and transportation capacity in






Consent Decree required the
divestiture of Consolidated’s
subsidiary, Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.,






Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman Corp., both
integrated defense contractors, proposed to merge. The
DOJ alleged that the acquisition would give Lockheed control
over all of Northrop’s military platforms, prime contracts, and
capabilities in critical systems and subsystems, providing it
with the incentive to refuse to sell, sell inferior quality, or sell
on unfavorable terms these systems to its integrated
electronics system competitors, and that Northrop’s systems
engineering and technical assistance services contracts
would give Lockheed access to competitors’ sensitive
information. The DOJ also alleged horizontal theories of
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In re
PacificCorpxxvii
PacifiCorp, a provider of retail electricity in seven states and
of wholesale electricity in others, proposed to acquire The
Energy Group PLC (“TEG”), which owned Peabody Coal
Company, a coal-mine operator. TEG supplied coal to the
Navajo and Mojave Generating Stations, which competed
with PacifiCorp’s generating assets in the Western Systems
Coordinating Council, an electricity pool. The FTC alleged
that PacifiCorp would have an incentive (1) to manipulate the
costs of its coal to affect the contract prices to Navajo and
Mojave Generating Stations and refrain from offering them
discounts if the coal price were to fall or if its mines were to
have excess capacity; and (2) to access competitively








Consent Decree required PacifiCorp
to divest Peabody Western Coal
Company, the subsidiary owning the
mines that supplied competitors. The





Primestar, Inc., an investment entity controlled by five cable
companies, proposed to acquire the satellite assets of MCI
Communications Corp., The News Corporation Limited, and
K. Rupert Murdoch, which included the only orbital slot from
which direct-broadcast service (“DBS”) video programming
could be offered. The DOJ alleged that the acquisition would
allow the cable companies to deny the orbital slot to their
DBS competitors, preserving their cable monopolies.
Input foreclosure Transaction abandoned.
1997 In re TRW
Inc.xxix
TRW Inc. and BDM International Inc. proposed to merge.
TRW was part of a joint venture competing for the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization’s Lead Systems Integrator
(“LSI”) contract while BDM was the sole supplier of systems
engineering and technical assistance (“SETA”) services for
the program. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would
enable TRW to access its competitors’ competitively sensitive
bidding information and that TRW’s SETA role would allow it
to favor its own bids through the setting of procurement rules







Consent Decree required TRW to
divest BDM’s contract with the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
for SETA services and all related
assets.
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In re Shell Oil
Co.xxx
Shell Oil Co. and Texaco, Inc. proposed to form a joint
venture combining their various gasoline, fuel, and pipeline
assets. Shell and another company made the majority of
asphalt used in Northern California, and both bought the
undiluted heavy crude used to make the asphalt from
Texaco’s pipeline. The FTC alleged that the JV could raise
the cost of crude for Shell’s competitor, leading to an
increase in the price for asphalt. The FTC also alleged
numerous horizontal theories of harm in other markets.
Input foreclosure Consent Decree required the JV to
enter into a ten-year supply
agreement with Shell’s competitor for






Cadence Design Systems, Inc. (“Cadence”), a leading
supplier of integrated circuit layout environments, proposed
to acquire Cooper & Chryan Technology, Inc. (“CCT”), a
supplier of integrated circuit routing tools. The FTC alleged
that the merger would reduce Cadence’s incentives to permit
competing suppliers of routing tools to access its layout
environments on the same terms as it allowed developers of
tools which did not compete with CCT’s.
Input foreclosure Consent Decree required Cadence to
allow developers competing with CCT
to participate in its software interface
programs on the same terms as





Time Warner, Inc. (“TW”), a leading provider of cable
program networks and cable multi-video program distributor
(“MVPD”), proposed to acquire Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. (“Turner”), which owned several popular cable networks.
The FTC alleged that TW would refuse to carry competitors
of Turner’s CNN Network, such as Fox News or MSNBC, and






Consent Decree required TW (1) to
not bundle its own programming with
Turner programming; (2) to offer
Turner programming to rival MVPDs
at its pre-merger price; and (3) to
carry at least one rival network to






Lockheed Martin Corporation, one of the largest defense and
space contractors in the U.S., proposed to acquire Loral
Corporation, another defense and space contractor. The
proposed acquisition affected several markets.
Loral Corporation was the FAA’s systems engineering and
technical services (“SETA”) contractor, a position in which it
developed procurement specifications for the agency and










Consent Decree required Lockheed
Martin (1) to divest Loral’s SETA
contract; (2) to firewall competitively
sensitive information about tactical
fighter manufacturers using Loral
components; (3) to firewall
competitively sensitive information
about unmanned aerial vehicle
manufacturers using Loral integrated
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procurement auctions for which Loral was the SETA
contractor. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would give
Lockheed access to competitively sensitive information about
competing bidders, as well as allow Lockheed to tailor
procurement specifications or skew bid evaluations to raise
its rivals’ costs.
Loral was a supplier of critical components for tactical fighter
aircraft. Lockheed was a manufacturer of tactical fighter
aircraft. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would give
Lockheed access to competitively sensitive information about
its competitors who used Loral’s components.
Loral was a supplier of integrated communications systems
for unmanned aerial vehicles. Lockheed was a manufacturer
of unmanned aerial vehicles. The FTC alleged that the
acquisition would give Lockheed access to competitively
sensitive information about its competitors who used Loral’s
integrated communications’ systems.
As part of the acquisition, Loral’s space and
telecommunications business would be transferred to a new
entity (Loral Space) in which Lockheed Martin would obtain a
20% convertible preferred equity interest, and under which
Lockheed Martin would provide technical services including
R&D to Loral Space. The FTC also alleged a horizontal loss
of competition between Lockheed Martin and Loral Space in
commercial low-Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit
satellites, both from enhanced coordination and unilateral
effects from the partial ownership interest.
communications systems; (4) to limit
its ownership interest in Loral Space
to 20%; (5) to not provide any
personnel, information, or facilities to
Loral Space under the technical
services agreement; and (6) to not
share board members or officers with
Loral Space and not compensate any
Lockheed Martin officer or board
member based on the profits of Loral
Space.
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Thomson Corp., the world’s largest publisher of information
for professional markets, proposed to acquire West
Publishing Co., the largest publisher of legal research
materials in the U.S. Thomson licensed primary and
secondary law materials as well as additional services (such
as an electronic citator) to West’s primary competitor in
comprehensive online legal research services, Lexis-Nexis.
The DOJ alleged that the acquisition would increase
Thomson’s incentive and ability to increase the prices of,
reduce the quality of, or refuse access to Thomson materials
it provides to Lexis-Nexis. The DOJ also alleged horizontal
theories of harm in certain enhanced primary law products
and secondary law materials.
Input foreclosure Final Judgment required Thomson to
divest the electronic citator it provided
to Lexis and to extend terms of
existing database licenses to Lexis




Boeing Company, a manufacturer of high-altitude endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles, proposed to acquire the
Aerospace and Defense Business of Rockwell International
Corporation, which provided wing components to a rival
manufacturer of high-altitude endurance unmanned aerial
vehicles. The FTC alleged that the acquisition would allow
Boeing (1) to deny access to or degrade the quality of the
wings provided to the rival manufacturer of high-altitude
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles; and (2) to access
competitively sensitive information about the rival








Consent Decree required Boeing (1)
to offer the rival manufacturer of high-
altitude endurance unmanned aerial
vehicles the ability to change to a
different supplier of wing components
and deliver the assets necessary to
do so; and (2) to firewall the
competitively sensitive information of
the rival manufacturer of high-altitude
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles
obtained through supply of wing
components.
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Raytheon Company, a prime contractor bidding for the U.S.
Navy’s Submarine High Data Rate Satellite Communications
Terminal, proposed to acquire Chrysler Technologies
Holding, Inc. (“CTH”), a provider of antenna and terminal
controls that were an input into Submarine High Data Rate
Satellite Communications Terminals. Before the merger,
CTH had joined the bidding team for GTE Corporation, a
prime contractor competing with Raytheon. The FTC alleged
that the acquisition would allow Raytheon and GTE to use





Consent Decree required Raytheon to
firewall Raytheon’s and GTE’s
competitively sensitive information






Hughes Danbury Optical Systems (“HDOS”), a producer of
adaptive optics systems, proposed to acquire Itek Optical
Systems Division of Litton Industries, Inc., a producer of
deformable mirrors. There were two teams developing the
adaptive optics system, which required deformable mirrors,
for the U.S. Air Force’s Airborne Laser (“ABL”) program;
HDOS was part of the “Rockwell team” while Itek was part of
the “Boeing team.” Xinetics Inc., another producer of
deformable mirrors, had an exclusive contract with HDOS.
The FTC alleged that HDOS could (1) foreclose the Boeing
team from access to Itek or Xinetics deformable mirrors; and
(2) gain access to competitively sensitive information of the







Consent Decree required HDOS (1) to
not enforce the exclusivity provisions
with Xinetics Inc. for the ABL program;
and (2) to firewall competitively
sensitive information Itek received as
a member of the Boeing team.
59
Appendix: Vertical Merger Challenges (1994–2013)




Sprint Corp., France Telecom (“FT”), and Deutsche Telekom
(“DT”) proposed to form a joint venture for international
telecommunication services. Additionally, FT and DT agreed
to acquire 20% of voting equity in Sprint. The DOJ alleged
that the JV could: (1) restrict competitors from accessing
French and German public switched networks, infrastructure,
and public data networks controlled by FT and DT; (2) deny
operating agreements for a correspondent system in France
and Germany to competitors of the JV, which were necessary
for telecommunications traffic; and (3) obtain confidential
information from other U.S. carriers through the Sprint










Final Judgment required (1) FT and
DT to make services available to
competitors of the JV on a non-
discriminatory basis; (2) Sprint to
forego providing correspondent
telecommunication services with
France or Germany unless another
provider has an operating agreement;
(3) Sprint to disclose certain
information about its agreements with
DT and FT; and (4) FT and DT to
firewall Sprint and the JV from
competitively sensitive information of
Sprint’s rivals. The Final Judgment
also imposed certain additional
restrictions until facilities-based
competition with FT and DT were




Silicon Graphics, Inc. (“SGI”), a supplier of entertainment
graphics workstations, proposed to acquire Alias Research
Inc (“Alias”). and Wavefront Technology Inc. (“Wavefront”),
two developers of entertainment graphics software. The FTC
alleged that the new entity could foreclose rival workstation
producers from accessing critical entertainment graphics
software and could foreclose competing entertainment
graphics companies from developing software compatible
with SGI’s workstations. Additionally, Silicon could access
competitively sensitive information related to other









Consent Decree required SGI (1) to
enter an agreement with a rival
workstation provider to port Alias’s
and Wavefront’s entertainment
graphics software to the rivals’
systems; (2) to maintain an open
architecture for SGI systems and
publish SGI systems’ application
programming interfaces; and (3) to
maintain a software development
program for rivals of Alias and
Wavefront with similar terms to those
used for other development programs.
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Alliant Techsystems Inc. (“Alliant”), a manufacturer of
ammunition and munitions, proposed to acquire Hercules
Incorporated’s aerospace division, a supplier of propellant
used in large caliber ammunition. The FTC alleged that
Alliant would gain access to competitors’ confidential









Consent Decree required Alliant to
firewall competitively sensitive
information gained through Alliant’s
capacity as a propellant provider.
In re Eli Lilly &
Co., Inc.xli
Eli Lilly and Co., a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals,
proposed to acquire McKesson, Inc., which through its PCS
Health Systems, Inc. (“PCS”) subsidiary provided pharmacy
benefit management (“PBM”) services. As part of its PBM
services, PCS maintained a drug formulary, which included
several of Eli’s Lilly’s drugs. The FTC alleged that (1)
competing manufacturer’s drugs would likely be foreclosed
from the PCS formulary; (2) Eli Lilly would have access to
competitors’ proprietary information through the PBM
services; and (3) PCS would be eliminated as an












Consent Decree required Eli Lilly (1)
to maintain an open formulary
implemented by an independent
committee and to reflect all discounts
and rebates offered by other drug
manufacturers on the open formulary;
(2) to firewall Lilly’s competitively
sensitive information from being
released to Lilly competitors through
PCS; (3) to firewall PCS’s confidential
information from being released to







Lockheed Corp., a manufacturer of military aircraft, and
Martin Marietta Corp., a supplier of an infrared navigation and
targeting system (“LANTIRN”) for military aircraft, proposed
to merge. The FTC alleged that (1) the company could
modify Martin Marietta’s LANTIRN systems to raise the costs
of competing military aircraft; and (2) Lockheed’s military
aircraft division could access rival military aircraft
manufacturers’ sensitive information shared with Martin
Marietta to use its LANTIRN system. The FTC also alleged
horizontal losses of competition in the development of
expendable launch vehicles, in satellites for use in space-







Consent Decree required the merged
firm (1) to not modify the LANTIRN
system in a way that discriminated
against rival aircraft manufacturers
unless necessary; (2) to firewall
competitively sensitive information
from military aircraft competitors
obtained by Martin Marietta as part of
their use of the LANTIRN system; and
(3) to refrain from enforcing certain
teaming agreements to remove the
horizontal overlaps.
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1994 In re Martin
Marietta
Corp.xliii
Martin Marietta Corp., a manufacturer of satellites, proposed
to acquire General Dynamics Corp.’s Space Systems
Division, which produced expendable launch vehicles. The
FTC alleged that Martin Marietta could access confidential
information of competing satellite suppliers through its role as





Consent Decree required Martin
Marietta to firewall competitively
sensitive information of rival satellite
producers obtained in its role as a




AT&T Corp., the largest U.S. long distance telephone
company and a provider of cellular infrastructure equipment,
proposed to acquire McCaw Cellular Communications, the
largest cellular carrier. The DOJ alleged that (1) AT&T would
limit access to or raise the price of its cellular infrastructure
equipment to networks competing with McCaw’s; (2) McCaw
could gain access to its competitors’ competitively sensitive
information through their use of AT&T equipment; (3) AT&T
could gain access to its competitors’ competitively sensitive
information through McCaw’s use of their equipment; and (4)
McCaw could steer its customers to using AT&T’s
interexchange services, eliminating competition between









Final Judgment required AT&T (1) to
provide equal access to
interexchange competitors of AT&T;
(2) to firewall competitively sensitive
information McCaw obtained from
competing cellular infrastructure
equipment providers; (3) to firewall
competitively sensitive information
AT&T obtain from competing cellular
carriers; and (4) to continue to deal
with cellular infrastructure equipment
customers on current terms and on






British Telecommunications plc. (“BT”) proposed to acquire
20% interest in MCI Communications Corp. and to form a
joint venture for global telecommunication services. Global
telecommunications services were provided on a
“correspondent” basis, in which providers completed each
other’s traffic. The DOJ alleged that: (1) BT could use pricing
or contract terms to favor MCI for international
correspondence services; (2) MCI could gain access to
competitors’ competitively sensitive information through their
relationships with BT; and (3) BT could send all or most of its












Final Judgment required BT (1) to
follow transparency and disclosure
requirements for telecommunication
services between BT and MCI; and
(2) to firewall competitively sensitive
information from MCI’s competitors
obtained through BT’s correspondent
services.
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Tele-Communications, Inc. (“TCI”) and Liberty Media Corp.
(“Liberty”), both large cable multichannel subscription
television distributors (“MSTDs”) that had interests in video
programming networks, proposed to merge. Before the
merger, the firms had substantial cross-ownership and
cooperated closely. The DOJ alleged that, although their
cross-ownership and differing service areas had already
eliminated horizontal competition, the merger would (1) give
each company the incentive to deny or make more expensive
to rival video programming networks carriage on their cable
systems; and (2) give each company the incentive to deny or
make more expensive to rival MSTDs the programming from
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